The Neomercantilist Fallacy and the Contextual Reality of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act by Nichols, Philip M
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Legal Studies and Business Ethics Papers Wharton Faculty Research
2016
The Neomercantilist Fallacy and the Contextual
Reality of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Philip M. Nichols
University of Pennsylvania
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/lgst_papers
Part of the Business Commons, and the Law Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/lgst_papers/22
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Nichols, P. M. (2016). The Neomercantilist Fallacy and the Contextual Reality of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Harvard Journal
on Legislation, 53 203-246. Retrieved from http://repository.upenn.edu/lgst_papers/22
The Neomercantilist Fallacy and the Contextual Reality of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act
Abstract
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (the “Act”) may be one of the most misunderstood pieces of legislation
within the federal corpus of laws. Its genesis is often ascribed to an almost reactionary moral indignation over
the abuses of a presidential administration, whereas in reality Congress had more prosaic objectives, one of
the more important of which was to preserve and enhance the strength of the global market. The Act has often
been described as the first and for a time only law of its kind, even though in reality it joined a very similar
Swedish law.1 Most seriously, the Act has been analyzed through the prism of a mode of thought that could be
called neomercantilism, a mode of analysis that this Article demonstrates is fundamentally erroneous.
Neomercantilism draws from the much older political theory of mercantilism, which sought to increase
national wealth through managed trade. Mercantilism suffered from a fundamental misunderstanding of
concepts such as wealth and trade; similarly, neomercantilism fails to understand the world as it actually
exists. This Article identifies a basic fallacy in the neomercantilist mode of thought, namely that business can
be thought of as siloed within national boundaries and that some sort of neomercantilist scorecard can be
based on those siloed national champions.
Analysis of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act redounds with neomercantilist thought. Scholars persistently
speak of the Act as though it and only it applies to U.S. businesses, and as though U.S. businesses are
constrained by no other transnational corruption laws.2 Practitioners and policymakers often adopt the same
mode of analysis.3 Neither group is correct. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act by its very definitions applies
only to business firms or their affiliates that engage in some form of transnational activity.4 The reality of
transnational business activity, often labeled globalization, consists of networks of relationships that take little
notice of national borders and which cannot be siloed. Moreover, Congress intended for the Act to be part of a
global regime to control bribery.5 That regime has been created and is now the relevant regulatory
environment in which transnational business occurs. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act is domestic
legislation, an integral part of the federal law of the United States. Meaningful analysis of the Act, however,
must take account of the contextual reality of the transnational business firms regulated by the law and of the
global market that the law is intended to protect. To do otherwise not only lacks intellectual rigor but also
risks losing the benefits to be accrued from a well-functioning global market.
This Article begins in Part II with the definition of corruption used by Congress in the Act. Part III explores
Congress’ motives in enacting and amending the Act. Part IV demonstrates the use of neomercantilist thought
in analyses of the Act, while Part V explains the fallaciousness of that thought from the perspectives of both
business and regulatory reality. Part VI examines proposals to alter the Act, and shows how neomercantilist
thought skews analysis of those proposals and fails to identify important issues.
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This Article addresses a persistent failure in analysis of the Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act, by scholars and policymakers alike. Many discussions of the
Act approach it from a neomercantilist perspective. This approach contains
three flaws. First, whereas neomercantilism envisions manipulation of the mar-
ket to give advantage to national champion industries, the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act was adopted for the purpose of strengthening and enhancing the
integrity of the global market. A neomercantilist perspective is contrary to the
purpose of the Act. Second, this Article shows that neomercantilism fundamen-
tally misunderstands the world of business—the modern equivalent of the mer-
cantilist fallacy. Business firms form networks of relationships with little
reference to political borders, whereas neomercantilism envisions a world in
which business firms are siloed by national borders. By importing this fallacy, a
neomercantilist perspective invariably yields a flawed analysis. Third, Congress
asked that the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act become part of a global anticor-
ruption regime, and that request has been robustly answered. By its own defini-
tions the Act applies only to business actors engaged in transnational activities.
These business actors will also be subject to the other elements of the global
regime, as will their competitors. Neomercantilism cannot account for the Act’s
place in that regime. Legal analysis in general has difficulty in accounting for
domestic business regulations that encompass transnational behavior. Law must
overcome this difficulty or it risks becoming irrelevant to business. Analysis of
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act must avoid the neomercantilist approach, not
just for the sake of intellectual rigor, but also to accrue the benefits of a sound
market as envisioned by Congress.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (the “Act”) may be one of the most
misunderstood pieces of legislation within the federal corpus of laws. Its
genesis is often ascribed to an almost reactionary moral indignation over the
abuses of a presidential administration, whereas in reality Congress had
more prosaic objectives, one of the more important of which was to preserve
and enhance the strength of the global market. The Act has often been de-
scribed as the first and for a time only law of its kind, even though in reality
it joined a very similar Swedish law.1 Most seriously, the Act has been ana-
lyzed through the prism of a mode of thought that could be called neomer-
cantilism, a mode of analysis that this Article demonstrates is fundamentally
erroneous.
Neomercantilism draws from the much older political theory of mer-
cantilism, which sought to increase national wealth through managed trade.
Mercantilism suffered from a fundamental misunderstanding of concepts
such as wealth and trade; similarly, neomercantilism fails to understand the
world as it actually exists. This Article identifies a basic fallacy in the ne-
omercantilist mode of thought, namely that business can be thought of as
siloed within national boundaries and that some sort of neomercantilist
scorecard can be based on those siloed national champions.
1 See generally Michael Bogdan, International Trade and the New Swedish Provisions on
Corruption, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 665 (1979) (evaluating and criticizing the Swedish law).
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Analysis of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act redounds with neomer-
cantilist thought. Scholars persistently speak of the Act as though it and only
it applies to U.S. businesses, and as though U.S. businesses are constrained
by no other transnational corruption laws.2 Practitioners and policymakers
often adopt the same mode of analysis.3 Neither group is correct. The For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act by its very definitions applies only to business
firms or their affiliates that engage in some form of transnational activity.4
The reality of transnational business activity, often labeled globalization,
consists of networks of relationships that take little notice of national borders
and which cannot be siloed. Moreover, Congress intended for the Act to be
part of a global regime to control bribery.5 That regime has been created and
is now the relevant regulatory environment in which transnational business
occurs. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act is domestic legislation, an integral
part of the federal law of the United States. Meaningful analysis of the Act,
however, must take account of the contextual reality of the transnational
business firms regulated by the law and of the global market that the law is
intended to protect. To do otherwise not only lacks intellectual rigor but also
risks losing the benefits to be accrued from a well-functioning global
market.
This Article begins in Part II with the definition of corruption used by
Congress in the Act. Part III explores Congress’ motives in enacting and
amending the Act. Part IV demonstrates the use of neomercantilist thought
in analyses of the Act, while Part V explains the fallaciousness of that
thought from the perspectives of both business and regulatory reality. Part
VI examines proposals to alter the Act, and shows how neomercantilist
thought skews analysis of those proposals and fails to identify important
issues.
2 See, e.g., Michael J. Bazyler, Abolishing the Act of State Doctrine, 134 U. PA. L. REV.
325, 380 (1986); William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud
on the Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 137–38 (2011); Stephen Hagenbuch, Taming “Instru-
mentality”: The FCPA’s Legislative History Requires Proof of Government Control, U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 351, 351 (2012); Priya Cherian Huskins, FCPA Prosecutions: Liability Trend to
Watch, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1448 (2008); Matthew J. Spence, American Prosecutors as
Democracy Promoters: Prosecuting Corrupt Foreign Officials in U.S. Courts, 114 YALE L.J.
1185, 1189 n.22 (2005); Eric L. Talley, Cataclysmic Liability Risk Among Big Four Auditors,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1658 (2006).
3 See, e.g., Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Ter-
rorism, & Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 37 (2011) (statement
of George J. Terwilliger, III, Partner, White & Case LLP); Examining Enforcement of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Crime & Drugs of the S.
Judiciary Comm., 111th Cong. 20 (2010) (statement of Sen. Amy Klobuchar, (MN), Member,
Subcomm. on Crime & Drugs of the S. Judiciary Comm.).
4 See infra note 14 and accompanying text. R
5 See infra notes 63–66 and accompanying text. R
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II. A CIRCUMSCRIBED DEFINITION OF CORRUPTION
Discussions of corruption, whether empirical, doctrinal, or theoretical,
necessarily often begin by defining the object of their analysis. Indeed, some
discussions of corruption consist almost entirely of attempts to define the
term.6 Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s disturbingly simplistic defini-
tion, the term “corruption” avails itself of many definitions.7 Arnold Hei-
denheimer, drawing on the literatures of political science and of sociology,
suggests three broad categories of definitions.8 Ulrich von Alemann, draw-
ing primarily on European scholarship, suggests five thematic groups of at-
tempts to definitionally understand corruption.9 Clearly, corruption eludes
easy definition.
In spite of the difficulties in defining corruption, its definition can be of
critical importance. In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission’s re-
view of campaign finance legislation, for example, the Court acknowledged
that the government does have a cognizable interest in protecting the demo-
cratic process from corruption or even the appearance of corruption.10 The
Court went on, however, to use a novel and extremely narrow definition of
corruption, which excludes most forms of corrupt behavior.11 The Court’s
logic has been vehemently criticized for failing to take into account society’s
broader perception of corruption and for failing to protect the democratic
process from—indeed, for rendering it prone to—systemic degradation and
6 See, e.g., Arnold A. Rogow & H. D. Lasswell, The Definition of Corruption, in POLITI-
CAL CORRUPTION: READINGS IN COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 54 (Arnold J. Heidenheimer ed.,
1970).
7 See Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010) (limiting
actionable corruption to “quid pro quo corruption” and stating that “influence over or access
to elected officials does not mean that these officials are corrupt”); see also Lawrence Lessig,
A Reply to Professor Hasen, 126 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 61, 64–65 (2012) (criticizing the
Court’s definition of corruption).
8 Those categories are market-based, public interest-centered, and public office-centered
types of definitions. See Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Introduction to Part 1, in POLITICAL COR-
RUPTION: READINGS IN COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 3–6 (Arnold J. Heidenheimer ed., 1970); see
also Maryvonne Ge´naux, Social Sciences and the Evolving Concept of Corruption, 42 CRIME
L. & SOC. CHANGE 13, 13–16 (2004) (discussing the continued relevance of Heidenheimer’s
categorization).
9 Those themes are social decline, deviant behavior, logic of exchange, measurable per-
ceptions, and shadow politics. See Ulrich von Alemann, The Unknown Depths of Political
Theory: The Case for a Multidimensional Concept of Corruption, 42 CRIME L. & SOC.
CHANGE 25, 26 (2004).
10 558 U.S. at 356.
11 See id. at 357; see also Deborah Hellman, Defining Corruption and Constitutional De-
mocracy, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1385, 1387–88 (2013) (describing effects of the Court’s very
narrow definition of corruption and noting that “[t]here are, however, other ways to under-
stand corruption”); Michael Kang, Campaign Disclosure in Direct Democracy, 97 MINN. L.
REV. 1700, 1705 (2013) (“Citizens United narrowed its definition of quid pro quo corruption,
squeezing away the constitutional grounds for many longstanding forms of campaign finance
regulation.”).
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failure.12 Michael Kang suggests that the redefinition of corruption by the
Court will be Citizen United’s “lasting significance.”13
Definitions are of critical importance to an accurate analysis of the For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act. The definition of corruption used by the Act can
be found in the Act itself, which precisely defines the conduct that falls
within its ambit:
[An] offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the pay-
ment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization
of the giving of anything of value to any foreign official for pur-
poses of [either:] (A) (i) influencing any act or decision of such
foreign official in his official capacity, (ii) inducing such foreign
official to do or omit to do any act in violation of the lawful duty
of such official, or (iii) securing any improper advantage; or (B)
inducing such foreign official to use his influence with a foreign
government or instrumentality thereof to affect or influence any
act or decision of such government or instrumentality, in order to
assist such domestic concern in obtaining or retaining business for
or with, or directing business to, any person.14
As forcefully demonstrated by Citizens United, definitions of corruption
bound the scope of any legislation intended to deal with corruption. Any
analysis of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, therefore, requires sensitivity
to its definition of corruption. Three important qualifications must be drawn
from parsing the definition contained in the Act. First, despite its name, the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act concerns itself with only one iteration of cor-
rupt behavior—bribery. Second, the Act limits itself to bribery that is related
to business and business transactions. Third, the Act is concerned with brib-
ery that occurs outside of the United States or that relates to a transaction
that extends beyond the United States. By its very definition, the Act is only
relevant if a business firm is in some way active outside of the United States.
A business firm that does not participate in commercial activities outside of
12 See Stephen M. Feldman, The Interpretation of Constitutional History, or Charles
Beard Becomes a Fortuneteller (With an Emphasis on Free Expression), 29 CONST. COMMENT.
323, 340–41 (2014) (arguing that the change in the definition of corruption undermines de-
mocracy); Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword: Democracy and Disdain, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1, 31
(2012) (describing criticisms of the Court’s definition); Spencer Overton, The Participation
Interest, 100 GEO. L.J. 1259, 1268 (2012) (describing and criticizing the effects of the change
in definition); Ganesh Sitaraman, Contracting Around Citizens United, 114 COLUM. L. REV.
755, 763 (2014) (describing controversies engendered by the Court’s definition).
13 Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign Finance Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 1, 4 (2012)
(“Citizen United’s lasting significance . . . is its doctrinal consequences for the definition of
corruption as a basis for campaign finance regulation.”); see Hellman, supra note 11, at 1388 R
(“The constitutional permissibility of most campaign finance cases has turned on how the
Court understands corruption.”).
14 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a) (2012). See generally Alejandro Posadas, Combat-
ting Corruption Under International Law, 10 DUKE J. INT’L L. 345, 360–61 (2000) (discussing
the statutory definition).
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the United States, that does not expose itself to the jurisdiction of other
countries and of international regimes, would not be relevant to a discussion
of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
III. ENACTMENT AND AMENDMENT OF THE FOREIGN
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
Understanding these three conditions of its definition is critical in craft-
ing appropriate analyses of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. So too is un-
derstanding why the legislation was enacted and eventually amended.
Congress very clearly intended for the Act to enhance the integrity and func-
tionality of the global market. The Act, therefore, must be analyzed through
the lens of that objective.
A. Enactment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to Enhance
the Global Market
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was enacted in 1977, in the after-
math of a congressional investigation into abuse of power by the administra-
tion of President Richard Nixon.15 The abuse of power and the subsequent
investigation, intertwined under the sobriquet “Watergate,” profoundly
shocked the United States and continue to affect political attitudes to this
day.16 Although most of the nation’s attention was focused on the misbehav-
iors of the federal government, congressional hearings discovered that many
large U.S. business firms had paid bribes to foreign officials as well.17
The proximity of the enactment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to
Watergate has given rise to a convenient narrative: national revulsion at the
gross misconduct of the presidential administration facilitated the enactment
of a law criminalizing the bribery of foreign officials.18 It is quite likely that
15 See Philip M. Nichols, Are Facilitating Payments Legal?, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 127, 130
(2013) (“The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was enacted in 1977, following a period of tumul-
tuous political revelations known collectively as ‘Watergate.’”).
16 See ARTHUR G. NEAL, NATIONAL TRAUMA AND COLLECTIVE MEMORY: EXTRAORDI-
NARY EVENTS AND THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 124 (2d ed., 2005) (describing the extraordi-
nary angst and political re-evaluation caused by the Watergate revelations).
17 See Beverley Earle, Bribery and Corruption in Eastern Europe, the Baltic States, and
the Commonwealth of Independent States: What Is To Be Done?, 33 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 483,
487 (2000). But see Mike Koehler, The Fac¸ade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907,
911–12 (2010) (pointing out that the U.S. Congress was actively investigating overseas bribery
before the Watergate revelations).
18 See, e.g., H. Lowell Brown, Parent-Subsidiary Liability Under the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 2 (1998) (suggesting that enactment occurred “[i]n the
maelstrom of moral outrage at the political and corporate abuses revealed in the course of the
Watergate affair”); Aaron G. Murphy, The Migratory Patterns of Business in the Global Vil-
lage, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 229, 233 n.10 (2005) (suggesting that enactment “was clearly an
attempt to codify a moral reaction to the outrage over the corporate scandals that followed the
Watergate fiasco”); Duane Windsor & Kathleen A. Getz, Multilateral Cooperation to Combat
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the mood of the nation did contribute to the passage of the bill.19 In a
thoughtful discussion of the history of the Act, however, Mike Koehler finds
that moral concerns were only one of four policy considerations that contrib-
uted to its enactment.20 Other considerations included damage to the United
States’ relationships with countries in which bribes had been paid, possible
erosion of the United States’ position as a global leader, and—most perti-
nently—the significant damage that bribery could cause to the global mar-
ketplace.21 The value of moral probity, respectful foreign relations, and
steady global leadership should not be minimized.22 The observations and
commentary of legislators and the experts they called upon when debating
enactment of the Act, however, suggest that Congress was deeply concerned
with the effect that bribery has on the global economic system.
In those debates, legislators and witnesses viewed bribery as presenting
an existential threat to international business. The Senate Report that accom-
panied the Senate version of the Act described bribery as “fundamentally
destructive of th[e] basic tenet” of business and stated that it threatened
“the very stability of overseas business.”23 The Secretary of the Treasury
testified that the “preservation of the free enterprise system” was at stake.24
An Assistant Secretary of the Treasury similarly testified that bribery puts “a
market economy . . . into jeopardy.”25
The legislative history reveals an impressive understanding within Con-
gress of the manners in which bribery can degrade the global market and
economy. The House Report that accompanied the House Bill stated that
bribery “short circuits the marketplace.”26 It does so “by directing business
to those companies too inefficient to compete in terms of price, quality or
service, or too lazy to engage in honest salesmanship, or too intent upon
Corruption: Normative Regimes Despite Mixed Motives and Diverse Values, 33 CORNELL
INT’L L.J. 731, 743 (2000) (attributing enactment to a “post-Watergate morality”).
19 See William Magnuson, International Corporate Bribery and Unilateral Enforcement,
51 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 360, 379–80 (2013) (“The United States might never have passed
the FCPA had it not been for the Watergate scandal.”).
20 See Mike Koehler, The Story of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 79 OHIO ST. L.J.
929, 938 (2012).
21 See id. at 938–49.
22 See Kevin E. Davis, Why does the United States Regulate Foreign Bribery: Moralism,
Self-Interest, or Altruism?, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497, 498–501 (2012) (describing the
moral motivations for enactment, and pointing out that the United States had a vital interest in
being perceived as a moral leader during the Cold War); Andrew Brady Spalding, Unwitting
Sanctions: Understanding Anti-Bribery Legislation as Economic Sanctions Against Emerging
Markets, 62 FLA. L. REV. 351, 358–59 (2012) (discussing the extent to which bribery of for-
eign officials created a foreign policy problem for the United States).
23 S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 4 (1977).
24 Lockheed Bribery: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs,
94th Cong. 11 (1975) (statement of William E. Simon, Sec’y of the Treasury).
25 Foreign Payments Disclosure: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Prot. &
Fin. of the H. Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong. 83 (1976) (statement of
Gerald L. Parsky, Assistant Sec’y of the Treasury).
26 H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4 (1976).
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unloading marginal products.”27 In the opening statement of the Senate
Hearing on Foreign and Corporate Bribes, the Chair stated that “[t]he prac-
tice of bribing foreign officials has corrupted . . . the free market system,
under which the most efficient producers with the best products are sup-
posed to prevail.”28 Numerous other legislators and witnesses commented on
the distortions that bribery introduces into the competitive underpinnings of
markets. Senator Tower lauded “vigorous, honest competition where price,
quality, and service commingle with demand and supply to regulate eco-
nomic transactions,” which bribery “poisons” and “destroy[s].”29 The
Chair of the Securities Exchange Commission condemned bribery as
“erod[ing] . . . the free, competitive and effective marketplace.”30 Ralph
Nader, a consumer advocate, quoted the Chair of Pitney-Bowes in condemn-
ing bribery for “subvert[ing] the laws of supply and demand” and added
that bribes “short-circuit competition based on classical ideas of product
quality, service and price, and free markets are replaced by contrived
markets.”31
These observations, made almost forty years ago, are amply supported
by research on corruption over the last fifteen years. There is no doubt that
corruption distorts economies and the free market system. Selc¸uk Akc¸ay
succinctly summarizes empirical research on the effects of corruption:
[Corruption] reduces economic growth, retards long-term domes-
tic and foreign investments, enhances inflation, depreciates na-
tional currency, reduces expenditures for education and health,
increases military expenditures, misallocates talent to rent-seeking
activities, pushes firms underground, distorts markets and the allo-
cation of resources, increases income inequality and poverty,
reduces tax revenues, increases child and infant mortality rates,
distorts the fundamental role of the government (on enforcement
of contracts and protection of property rights), and undermines the
legitimacy of government and of the market economy.32
Indeed, Congress had much reason for concern about international business
bribery.
27 Id.
28 Foreign and Corporate Bribes: Hearings on S. 3133 Before the S. Comm. on Banking,
Hous. & Urban Affairs, 94th Cong. 1 (1976) [hereinafter Foreign and Corporate Bribes]
(statement of Sen. William Proxmire (WI), Chair, S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban
Affairs).
29 122 CONG. REC. 30322 (1976) (statement of Sen. Tower).
30 Unlawful Corporate Payments Act of 1977: Hearings on H.R. 3815 and H.R. 1602
Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Prot. & Finance of the H. Comm. on Interstate & Foreign
Commerce, 95th Cong. 196 (1977) [hereinafter Unlawful Corporate Payments Act of 1977]
(statement of Harold M. Williams, Chair, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n).
31 Foreign and Corporate Bribes, supra note 28, at 19 (Statement of Ralph Nader, Con- R
sumer Advocate).
32 Selc¸uk Akc¸ay, Corruption and Human Development, 26 CATO J. 29, 29–30 (2006).
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Bribery changes the bases on which business decisions are made. In a
properly functioning market, consumers decide which good or service to
purchase by considering price and quality.33 In a corrupted system, on the
other hand, bribe-taking consumers do not consider the price or quality of
goods or services but instead make decisions based on the size and quality of
a bribe.34 At best, a process distorted in this way will produce lower quality
goods and services.35 At worst, the process will result in large-scale misallo-
cation of resources.36
Empirical studies bear out these predictions: studies find that corruption
does inflict substantial damage on the global economic process.37 Bribery
distorts the decision-making process by creating incentives for bribe-takers
to delay, obfuscate, or hide information.38 Studies associate corruption with
depressed economic growth, lower rates of investment, inflation, and cur-
rency depreciation.39 Studies find a link between corruption and dispropor-
tionate military spending,40 and between levels of corruption and the ratio of
both public education spending and public health spending to gross domestic
product.41
In addition to understanding the many ways in which bribery distorts
the mechanics of markets, Congress also recognized that bribery undermines
33 See Mark B. Bader & Bill Shaw, Amendment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 627, 627 (1983).
34 Id.
35 See Shouyong Shi & Ted Temzelides, A Model of Bureaucracy and Corruption, 45 INT’L
ECON. REV. 873, 874 (2004).
36 See, e.g., A. Cooper Drury, Jonathan Krieckhaus & Michael Lusztig, Corruption, De-
mocracy, and Economic Growth, 27 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 121, 123 (2006) (“[P]olicymakers
may promote initiatives . . . not to satisfy social need, but because such projects increase
opportunities for bribes.”); Rene´ Ve´ron et al., Decentralized Corruption or Corrupt Decentral-
ization? Community Monitoring of Poverty-Alleviation Schemes in Eastern India, 34 WORLD
DEV. 1922, 1925 (2006) (warning of “less effective and less well targeted” decisions).
37 See generally Drury, Krieckhaus & Lusztig, supra note 36, at 122 (listing and discuss- R
ing empirical studies).
38 See Abhijit V. Banerjee, A Theory of Misgovernance, 112 Q.J. ECON. 1289, 1292
(1997).
39 See, e.g., Fahim A. Al-Marhubi, Corruption and Inflation, 66 ECON. LETTERS 199, 199
(2000) (finding a significant positive relationship between corruption and inflation); Mohsen
Bahmani-Oskooee & Abm Nasir, Corruption, Law and Order, Bureaucracy, and Real Ex-
change Rate, 50 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 1021, 1026 (2002) (finding that countries
with corruption “tend to experience a real depreciation in their currency”); Pak Hung Mo,
Corruption and Economic Growth, 29 J. COMP. ECON. 66, 76 (2001) (finding that a one per-
cent increase in the amount of corruption decreases growth in gross domestic product by al-
most three-quarters of a percent); Paolo Mauro, Corruption and Growth, 110 Q.J. ECON. 681,
705 (1995) (“[N]egative association [exists] between corruption and investment, as well as
growth, [which] is significant in both a statistical and an economic sense . . . .”); Shang-Jin
Wei, How Taxing is Corruption on International Investors?, 82 REV. ECON. & STAT. 1, 8
(2000) (“An increase in the corruption level from that of Singapore to that of Mexico would
have the same negative effect on inward [foreign investment] as raising the tax rate by eigh-
teen to fifty percentage points.”).
40 See Sanjeev Gupta, Luiz de Mello & Raju Sharan, Corruption and Military Spending,
17 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 749, 750–51 (2001).
41 Paolo Mauro, Corruption and the Composition of Government Expenditure, 69 J. PUB.
ECON. 263, 272–74 (1998).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\53-1\HLL108.txt unknown Seq: 10 20-JAN-16 10:26
212 Harvard Journal on Legislation [Vol. 53
confidence in markets and other business institutions. The House Report that
accompanied the Act flatly stated that bribery “erodes public confidence in
the integrity of the free market system.”42 The Senate Report urged strong
action “to restore public confidence in the integrity of the American busi-
ness system.”43
Not surprisingly, studies have found that corruption is strongly linked
to mistrust of government and other institutions.44 Bribery “undermines the
very legitimacy of democratic government. If payoffs are a routine part of
life, ordinary people will despair of the very idea that they, together with
their fellow citizens, can control their destinies through the democratic rule
of law.”45 Bribery in particular undermines trust in business institutions.46
Studies around the world have found corruption to be the single greatest
contributor to mistrust of government and market institutions.47
Degradation of trust in government and market institutions would sub-
stantially damage the global business environment. Trust facilitates eco-
nomic relationships and decreases the costs associated with economic
transactions.48 Some developmental scholars therefore consider trust to be a
critical factor in supporting healthy economic growth.49 Conversely, distrust
bred by corruption tends to drive economic activity into the informal sector,
where it is less inclusive and less productive.50
The experts testifying in congressional hearings on the Act even under-
stood that bribery increases business costs.51 For example, the General Coun-
42 H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4 (1977).
43 S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 4 (1977).
44 See, e.g., Adam H. Kurland, The Guarantee Clause as a Basis for Federal Prosecutions
of State and Local Officials, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 367, 486 (1989); Susan Rose-Ackerman, The
Political Economy of Corruption, in CORRUPTION AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 31, 45
(Kimberly Ann Elliott ed., 1997).
45 Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 694 (2000).
46 See Bernard S. Black & Anna S. Tarassova, Institutional Reform in Transition: A Case
Study of Russia, 10 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 211, 230 (2003).
47 See, e.g., Nancy Zucker Boswell, Combatting Corruption: Focus on Latin America, 3
Sw. J.L. & TRADE AMS. 179, 184 (1996); Cheryl W. Gray & William W. Jarosz, Law and the
Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment: The Experience from Central and Eastern Europe,
33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 28 (1995); Ji-Young Kim, “Bowling Together” Isn’t a Cure-
All: The Relationship between Social Capital and Political Trust in South Korea, 26 INT’L POL.
SCI. REV. 193, 199 (2005); Natalia Melgar, Maximo Rossi & Tom W. Smith, The Perception
of Corruption, 22 INT’L J. PUB. OPINION RES. 120, 120 (2009).
48 See Frank B. Cross, Law and Trust, 93 GEO. L.J. 1457, 1477 (2005).
49 See Black & Tarassova, supra note 46, at 230 & n.22 (summarizing research). R
50 See, e.g., Philip M. Nichols, United States v. Lazarenko: The Trial and Conviction of
Two Former Prime Ministers of Ukraine, 2012 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 41, 58–60 (2012) (discussing
relationship between corruption and parallel institutions); Claire Wallace & Rossalina Latch-
eva, Economic Transformation Outside the Law: Corruption, Trust in Public Institutions and
the Informal Economy in Transition Countries of Central and Eastern Europe, 58 EUR.-ASIA
STUD. 81, 98–100 (2006).
51 See Unlawful Corporate Payments Act of 1977, supra note 30, at 28 (statement of R
Gordon Adams, Director of Military Research, Council on Economic Priorities) (“In the long
run, this practice can reduce trade and investment opportunities, thus limiting a company’s
growth.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\53-1\HLL108.txt unknown Seq: 11 20-JAN-16 10:26
2016] Neomercantilist Fallacy 213
sel to the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, a government agency
tasked with promoting outward investment, astutely noted that “[a]lthough
such payments may result in short-run advantages, in the long run they are
likely to cause serious problems to the investor.”52 In the 1960s and 1970s,
some scholars argued that corruption acted as a means of circumventing bu-
reaucratic obstacles.53 The “grease money” notion still occasionally appears
in contemporary scholarship.54 Theory, however, has evolved, as has the
ability to measure operational costs imposed by bribery, and both suggest
that the payment of bribes imposes high business costs.55
Speculation that bribery enhances efficiency was premised on a belief
that bribery existed exogenously to the relationship between the bribe-giver
and the bribe-taker.56 This notion, however, is categorically wrong: bribery
becomes the essence of their relationship.57 Using this more accurate under-
standing of the embedded, dynamic relationship between a bribe and the
actors, Daniel Kaufmann and Shang-Jin Wei developed a theoretical model
which predicted that bribes create more, not fewer, costs and generate more
time dealing with bureaucracy.58 Since Kaufmann and Wei, several other
empirical studies, using different data sets and methodologies, have found
that the payment of bribes increases rather than decreases the cost of and
time spent interacting with government.59 Bribery increases business costs.
52 The Activities of American Multinational Corporations Abroad: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Int’l Econ. Policy of the H. Comm. on Int’l Relations, 94th Cong. 6 (1975) (state-
ment of Michael F. Butler, Vice President & General Counsel, Overseas Private Investment
Corporation).
53 James Thuo Gathii, Corruption and Donor Reforms: Expanding the Promises and Pos-
sibilities of the Rule of Law as an Anti-Corruption Strategy in Kenya, 14 CONN. J. INT’L L.
407, 425 (1999).
54 See, e.g., Amy L. Chua, The Paradox of Free Market Democracy: Rethinking Develop-
ment Policy, 41 HARV. INT’L L.J. 287, 310 (2000) (using the term); Charles B. Weinograd,
Clarifying Grease: Mitigating the Threat of Overdeterrence by Defining the Scope of the Rou-
tine Governmental Action Exception, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 509, 517 (2010) (describing bribes that
“are intended merely to lubricate wheels that bureaucratic friction would otherwise grind to a
halt”).
55 Philip M. Nichols, The Business Case for Complying with Bribery Laws, 49 AM. BUS.
L.J. 325, 331–34 (2012).
56 See Steven R. Salbu, Battling Global Corruption in the New Millennium, 31 L. & POL’Y
INT’L BUS. 47, 49 (1999) (criticizing the old method of analysis).
57 See, e.g., Beverley Earle & Anita Cava, Are Anti-Corruption Efforts Paying Off? Inter-
national and National Measures in the Asia-Pacific Region and Their Impact on India and
Multinational Corporations, 31 U. HAW. L. REV. 59, 84 (2009) (describing conversations with
corporate counsels of bribe-paying firms); David Hess & Thomas W. Dunfee, Fighting Cor-
ruption: A Principled Approach; The C2 Principles (Combating Corruption), 33 CORNELL
INT’L L.J. 593, 595 (2000); Elizabeth Spahn, Nobody Gets Hurt?, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 861, 887
(2010) (describing conversations with leaders of bribe-paying firms).
58 Daniel Kaufmann & Shang-Jin Wei, Does “Grease Money” Speed Up the Wheels of
Commerce? 5 (World Bank Pol’y Res., Working Paper No. 2254, 1999), http://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=629191 [http://perma.cc/T4F4-P2H2].
59 See, e.g., Donato De Rosa, Nishaal Gooroochurn & Holger Go¨rg, Corruption and Pro-
ductivity: Firm-Level Evidence from the BEEPS Survey 3–6 (World Bank Pol’y Res., Working
Paper No. 5348, 2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1630232 [http://
perma.cc/2TBZ-EXTB]; Alejandro Gaviria, Assessing the Effects of Corruption and Crime on
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The popular, convenient account of the genesis of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act ascribes its enactment to the moral outrage felt by a nation
betrayed by its leaders. Reality is more complex. Although many members
of Congress undoubtedly shared the nation’s indignation, Congress had far
more pragmatic concerns. Bribery degrades the integrity and functionality of
the global market. Congress legitimately enacted the Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act to limit that degradation and to enhance the quality of the global
market. Meaningful analysis of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act must be
respectful of this objective.
B. Amendments to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Congress first amended the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in 1988,
eleven years after its enactment.60 Several of the amendments were technical
in nature and simply made the Act clearer and easier to apply.61 The amend-
ments also created an exception for bribes paid to secure nondiscretionary
government action—the “facilitating payment” exception.62
Both the Executive and the Congress also expressed their beliefs that
minimizing the deleterious effects of bribery required a multinational re-
gime. Prior to the Act’s amendment, President Carter emphasized his
“deep[ ] commit[ment] to the principles of the Act” and reported that his
administration sought “multilateral agreement in the United Nations.”63 The
Department of Commerce elaborated:
Firm Performance: Evidence from Latin America, 3 EMERGING MKTS. REV. 245, 267 (2002);
Jakob Svensson, The Cost of Doing Business: Firms’ Experience with Corruption, in
UGANDA’S RECOVERY: THE ROLE OF FARMS, FIRMS, AND GOVERNMENT 319, 319–20 (Ritva
Reinikka & Paul Collier eds., 2001).
60 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418,
§§ 5001–5003, 102 Stat. 1415, 1424 (1988). The amendments also raised the level of scienter
required for liability to be imposed for the actions of third parties, and increased the size of
penalties imposed for violations of the Act. See Gideon Mark, Private FCPA Enforcement, 49
AM. BUS. L.J. 419, 428–29 (2012).
61 Among other technical changes, the amendment expanded the definition of bribery,
expanded the definition of foreign public officials, imposed jurisdiction based on the national-
ity principle and on connection to the United States, and clarified penalties. See Barbara
Crutchfield George, Kathleen A. Lacey & Jutta Birmele, The 1998 OECD Convention: An
Impetus for Worldwide Changes in Attitudes Toward Corruption in Business Transactions, 37
AM. BUS. L.J. 485, 511–12 (2000).
62 See Nichols, supra note 15, at 129–34 (describing the facilitating payment exception). R
Congress added the facilitating payment exception largely at the request of businesses, who
complained that the criminalization of facilitating payments placed them at a disadvantage
with respect to businesses that were free to make such payments. See Jon Jordan, The OECD’s
Call for an End to “Corrosive” Facilitation Payments and the International Focus on the
Facilitation Payments Exception Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 13 U. PA. J. BUS.
L. 881, 891–93 (2011). The evidence offered to support these claims was primarily anecdotal.
See Barry Richman, Can We Prevent Questionable Foreign Payments?, BUS. HORIZONS 14, 16
(June 1979); see also Bill Shaw, Foreign Corrupt Practice Act: Amendments of 1988, 14 MD.
J. INT’L L. & TRADE 161, 164 (1990) (noting and describing conflicting claims to evidence).
63 U.S. DEPT. COMM., REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT ON EXPORT PROMOTION FUNCTIONS AND
POTENTIAL EXPORT DISINCENTIVES 10 (1980).
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The United States has urged that multilateral international action is
essential to solve these problems; that host countries have a strong
interest in eliminating practices that raise the cost of goods and
services they purchase, distort development programs, and under-
mine public confidence in government; and that the major trading
powers have a strong interest in eliminating extortion and bribery
which distorts international trade and investment and implicate
their nationals in conduct which corrupts the decision making pro-
cess of foreign governments. Accordingly, the United States has
continued to support the adoption of an international agreement
which would establish a framework for cooperation among nations
to control bribery and extortion involving government officials
with respect to international commercial activities.64
In amending the Act, Congress embraced and sharpened this position.
The Act includes instructions to the President:
It is the sense of Congress that the President should pursue the
negotiation of an international agreement, among the members of
the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, to
govern persons from those countries concerning acts prohibited
with respect to issuers and domestic concerns by the amendments
made by this section.65
Congress’s reasoning for specifically nominating the Organization of Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development is not elaborated upon in the legisla-
tive history; the nomination was simply added by the Senate in the
reconciliation between the two chambers.66 Nonetheless, the specific direc-
tion regarding the Organization proved fruitful.67
The Executive Branch took Congress’s instructions seriously, and the
organs of the U.S. government worked with their counterparts in Europe and
East Asia to create an international anticorruption regime.68 In 1998, Con-
gress amended for the last time the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, making
minor adjustments so that the Act would comply with that regime.69
64 Id. at 9–10.
65 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988 § 5003(d) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 78dd.-1).
66 H.R. REP. NO. 100-576, at 924 (1988).
67 See Combating the Bribery of Foreign Public Officials: Hearings Before the S. Comm.
on Foreign Relations, 105th Cong. 3 (1998) (statement by Stuart E. Eizenstat, Under Secretary
of State for Economic, Business & Agricultural Affairs) (explaining that working with the
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development played a central role in government
policy).
68 See Robert Plotkin & Nicholas Lewis, International Financial Institutions and the
Global War on Corruption, 33 BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL’Y REP. 1, 1–2 (2014) (stating that
the United States worked with partners to create a global regime).
69 International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366,
§§ 1–6, 112 Stat. 3302 (1998). Among other technical changes, the amendment expanded the
definition of “bribery,” expanded the definition of “foreign public official,” imposed jurisdic-
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Congress enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to support and en-
hance the functioning of the global market. Congress amended the Act with
a call to other countries to participate in the enhancement of the global mar-
ket, and again amended the Act to conform with the mandates of the result-
ing international regime. The context in which the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act should be analyzed, therefore, is as a market-enhancing tool. Many com-
mentators, however, approach the Act from a different and ultimately unpro-
ductive perspective.
IV. NEOMERCANTILIST THOUGHT IN DISCUSSION AND CRITICISM OF THE
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
As a highly visible and significant piece of domestic legislation, the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act has inspired substantial critical discussion.
Some of that discussion revolves around predictable nodes such as constitu-
tionality, criminal procedure, or legal theory. This Article does not evaluate
the merits of any position in that discussion. Rather, this paper criticizes a
philosophy that seems to undergird much of the discussion and criticism of
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. That philosophy could be called the ne-
omercantilist motif.
A. The Neomercantilist Motif in Scholarly Criticism of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act
Scholarly literature persistently speaks of the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act as if it only affects U.S. business firms, and as if U.S. business firms are
affected only by it.70 These characterizations treat business as if it were si-
loed by political boundaries. Michael Bazyler’s description typifies these
characterizations:
Another important federal law regulating the practice of American
business in the international marketplace is the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA). The [Act] prohibits the payment of
bribes by American businesses to officials of foreign governments
on the grounds that such activities hurt rather than help our foreign
commerce. The executive branch, through the Justice Department,
enforces the Act by bringing suit against the American offender.71
tion based on the nationality principle and on connection to the United States, and clarified
penalties. See George, Lacey & Birmele, supra note 61, at 511–12. R
70 Many of the sources cited in this article use the term “American” to describe persons or
firms associated with the United States. The use of the term “American” to describe residents
of the United States is widespread in the United States and in some parts of the world but is
resisted in others, particularly in Latin America or other parts of North America. See H. L.
Mencken, Names for Americans, 22 AM. SPEECH 241, 241 (1947). This article uses the term
“U.S.” when possible but does not presume to alter quoted sources.
71 Michael J. Bazyler, Abolishing the Act of State Doctrine, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 325, 380
(1986) (emphasis added).
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Bazyler is hardly alone; William Bratton and Michael Wachter similarly de-
scribe “corporate corruption” by “American” companies paid “abroad in
pursuit of shareholder value at home.”72 The Act is described as “only
appl[ying] to activities abroad committed by U.S. businesses and nation-
als.”73 The impetus for enactment has been described as restoration of “pub-
lic confidence in the integrity of the American business system.”74
The silo concept of business probably leads to another oft-found trope
in the scholarly analysis of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: that it renders
U.S. businesses less competitive in the global marketplace. This claim is
often made simply and shortly. Stephen Hagenbuch, for example, asserts
that vague definitions in the Act have “harmed U.S. competitiveness.”75 As
China has grown in economic stature, scholars have taken to asserting that
the Act places U.S. businesses at a disadvantage in China.76
Given the purposes in enacting the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
scholarly focus on the competitiveness of a business is at a minimum mis-
placed. This Article will go on to show that it is also misguided and makes
erroneous assumptions. Scholars, however, are not alone. Many policymak-
ers, legal practitioners, and especially lobbyists employ a similar mode of
thought in discussing the Act.
B. The Neomercantilist Motif in the Commentary of Policymakers,
Legal Practitioners, and Lobbyists
Policymakers, legal practitioners, and lobbyists do analyze the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, and they too emphasize the effect on the competitive-
ness of U.S. businesses. Some policymakers, of course, have a broader per-
spective of the Act. The former Chief of the Justice Department’s Criminal
Division, for example, frames the Act as part of “the creation of a global
consensus that corruption is unacceptable, that it harms the least well-off of
us the most” and links corruption to global social and economic ills.77 Simi-
72 William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud on the
Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 137–38 (2011).
73 Matthew J. Spence, American Prosecutors as Democracy Promoters: Prosecuting Cor-
rupt Foreign Officials in U.S. Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1185, 1189 n.22 (2005); see also Priya
Cherian Huskins, FCPA Prosecutions: Liability Trend to Watch, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1448
(2008) (“The FCPA fundamentally stands for the proposition that—notwithstanding local cus-
toms or business pressures to the contrary—U.S. businesses and persons should not bribe
foreign officials or foreign political parties.”).
74 Eric L. Talley, Cataclysmic Liability Risk Among Big Four Auditors, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 1641, 1658 (2006) (emphasis added).
75 Stephen Hagenbuch, Taming “Instrumentality”: The FCPA’s Legislative History Re-
quires Proof of Government Control, 2012 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 351, 353 (2012).
76 E.g., Murphy, supra note 18, at 255; Eric M. Pedersen, The Foreign Corrupt Practices R
Act and Its Application to U.S. Business Operating in China, 7 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 13, 35–36
(2008).
77 Mark Brzezinski, Obama’s Foreign Bribery Crackdown, WASH. POST (May 28, 2010),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/27/AR2010052704154.html
[http://perma.cc/B2HB-N6N9].
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larly, in a speech given to the General Assembly of the United Nations,
President Obama emphasized “that countries are more likely to prosper
when governments are accountable to their people. So we are leading a
global effort to combat corruption, which in many places is the single great-
est barrier to prosperity, and which is a profound violation of human
rights.”78
Other policymakers, however, emphasize instead the effect of the For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act on U.S. businesses. In hearings before a Senate
Subcommittee, for example, Senator Klobuchar mentioned that she lost
sleep at night worrying about “an uneven playing field that is hurting Amer-
ican business while we balance the obvious need to have this law on the
books and to enforce it and to go after egregious bribery.”79 Representative
Jim Sensenbrenner is blunter, and raises the shibboleth of jobs: “this Com-
mittee is well suited to examine the impact of the FCPA and to ask hard
questions about whether the act is succeeding in its mission or is needlessly
hurting American job creation.”80
Legal practitioners embrace the same mode of analysis. A partner in a
large practice, for example, uses almost the same language as Representative
Sensenbrenner, suggesting that the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act “hurts the
creation of jobs and the ability of U.S. companies to compete with compa-
nies elsewhere that do not have to concern themselves with uncertainties of
the terms and requirements of the FCPA.”81 The Director of White Collar
Crime Policy of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers uses
a similar analysis, suggesting that the Act places “U.S. companies and indi-
viduals . . . at a severe competitive disadvantage.”82
Lobbying organizations have vigorously embraced this mode of analy-
sis. The United States Chamber of Commerce83 has made “changing the
FCPA one of its top priorities.”84 The Chamber of Commerce criticizes the
Act as “a stumbling block for America’s ability to compete in today’s global
78 Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the Millennium Development Goals Sum-
mit in New York, New York (Sept. 22, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
2010/09/22/remarks-president-millennium-development-goals-summit-new-york-new-york
[http://perma.cc/SN4Q-C4EV].
79 Examining Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearings Before the S.
Subcomm. on Crime & Drugs of the S. Judiciary Comm., 111th Cong. 20 (2010) (statement of
Amy Klobuchar, Member, Subcomm. on Crime & Drugs of the S. Judiciary Comm.).
80 Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Security of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 2 (2011) (statement of Jim Sensenbrenner, Chair, Sub-
comm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary).
81 Id. at 37 (statement of George J. Terwilliger, III, Partner, White & Case LLP).
82 Id. at 52 (statement of Shana-Tara Regon, Director of White Collar Crime Policy, Na-
tional Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers).
83 The United States Chamber of Commerce is a private organization not associated with
the government.
84 Mark V. Vlasic & Peter Atlee, Democratizing the Global Fight Against Corruption: The
Impact of the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Bounty on the FCPA, 36 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF.
79, 87 (2012).
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economy.”85 A lawyer representing the Chamber editorialized that “Ameri-
can businesses will begin to cede global markets to less ethical foreign com-
petitors, making America less competitive and costing jobs.”86 The Chamber
even claimed that a Congressional Research Survey “estimate[d] that the
FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions have cost up to $1 billion annually in lost
U.S. export trade.”87 Gideon Mark, however, points out that the Congres-
sional Research Service made no such claim and instead merely pointed out
that critics claimed exports in that amount had been lost.88
It may be tempting to discount the rhetoric of a lobbying organization
such as the United States Chamber of Commerce as biased and therefore of
little consequence.89 In terms of actors analyzing the Act, however, the
Chamber must not be discounted. The United States Chamber of Commerce
is “widely regarded as the most powerful lobby in Washington.”90 The
Chamber has demonstrated that it can effectuate change in other arenas.91
The modes of thought used by the Chamber merit at least as much scrutiny
as the thinking of policymakers and practitioners. And as with many schol-
ars, the focus of the analysis of policymakers, practitioners, and lobbyists is
misplaced and misguided. Each of these analysts engages in a mode of
thinking that can fairly be described as neomercantilist. When applied to
rules such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, neomercantilist thought is
inherently fallacious.
85 Susan Rose-Ackerman & Sine´ad Hunt, Transparency and Business Advantage: The Im-
pact of International Anti-Corruption Policies on the United States National Interest, 67
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 433, 434 (2012) (quoting Press Release, U.S. Chamber Inst. for
Legal Reform, House Hearing is an Important Step Toward Modernizing FCPA (June 14,
2011)).
86 Michael B. Mukasey, Correct the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, USA TODAY (Apr. 29,
2012), http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/story/2012-04-29/Foreign-Corrupt-Practices-
Mukasey/54631334/1 [http://perma.cc/P7RS-5G3T].
87 ANDREW WEISSMANN & ALIXANDRA SMITH, U.S. CHAMBER INST. LEGAL REFORM, RE-
STORING BALANCE: PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 6
(2010), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/restoringbalance_fcpa.pdf
[http://perma.cc/QLH7-LM2U].
88 Mark, supra note 60, at 495 n.405; see Philip M. Nichols, Regulating Transnational R
Bribery in Times of Globalization and Fragmentation, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 257, 288–90 (1999)
(criticizing rigor of claims regarding competitiveness).
89 See, e.g., Michael A. McCann, Economic Efficiency and Consumer Choice Theory in
Nutritional Labeling, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1161, 1212 n.277 (discounting a study commissioned
by the Chamber of Commerce as biased).
90 Chris Brummer, Stock Exchanges and the New Markets for Securities Laws, 75 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1435, 1469 (2008). Journalists who observe political life in the United States agree.
See Dan Eggen & T.W. Farnam, GOP House Leaders See Corporate Donations Surge, WASH.
POST (Jan. 22, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/21/
AR2011012107038.html [http://perma.cc/RY42-FUEY] (describing the Chamber as “one of
Washington’s most powerful lobbying groups”); Corporate Lobbying: The Chamber of
Secrets, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 21, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21553020 [http://
perma.cc/EP3D-X6KB] (describing the Chamber of Commerce as “by far the most muscular
business lobby group in Washington”).
91 See John P. Freeman, Protecting Judicial Independence, 6 CHARLESTON L. REV. 511,
531 (2012) (condemning the Chamber’s success in interfering with the democratic election of
state judges).
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V. NEOMERCANTILISM AND THE NEOMERCANTILIST FALLACY
A. Mercantilism and the Mercantilist Fallacy
Neomercantilism draws from but is not necessarily descended from
mercantilism. The term “mercantilism” refers to a mode of political thought
that dominated Europe between the end of the feudal period and the begin-
ning of the Industrial Revolution.92 Obviously, any creed that endured for
such a long period in such a complex and diverse setting manifested itself in
equally complex and diverse ways.93 The various manifestations of mercan-
tilism across Europe, however, embraced a similar objective and employed a
similar tool to achieve that objective.94 Mercantilists aspired to elevate the
power of their nations relative to other nations.95 They attempted to do so by
accumulating more gold and silver than other countries.96 Mercantilist na-
tions managed trade for that purpose:
A crucial element of mercantilist thinking was that the production
of all goods ought primarily to take place, when at all possible, in
the country itself . . . . [T]he government ought to pursue an ac-
tive economic policy to stimulate export and nurture domestic in-
dustries that competed with foreign firms in the same industry
while limiting imports.97
Mercantilism thus represented the antithesis of later liberal attitudes towards
markets and economic activity; mercantilism in fact constituted a close alli-
ance between the state and businesses.98 Mercantilist policies included the
creation of trade monopolies and the military occupation of foreign mar-
92 E. RAY CANTERBERY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT: ARTFUL APPROACHES
TO THE DISMAL SCIENCE 33 (2d ed. 2011). Mercantilism made virtually no inroads outside of
Europe. Abdul Azim Islahi, Mercantilism and the Muslim States: Lessons from the History 3
(Munich Personal RePEc Archive, No. 22964, 2008), http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/22964/
1/MPRA_paper_22964.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZGU2-ZNVX].
93 See E.K. HUNT, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT: A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE 38 (2d ed.
2002) (stating that mercantilists were sophisticated thinkers who must be evaluated in the
context of the tumultuous transition from feudalism to markets). A brief history of mercantilist
thought can be found in HUNT, id. at 24–38; a much longer history can be found in LARS
MAGNUSSON, MERCANTILISM: THE SHAPING OF AN ECONOMIC LANGUAGE (1994).
94 See AGNAR SANDMO, ECONOMICS EVOLVING: A HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT 19
(2011) (arguing that even though disparate, the basic commonalities of mercantilism render it
an identifiable school of thought).
95 See CANTERBERY, supra note 92, at 35. Agnar Sandmo points out that during much of R
the period in which mercantilism prevailed, the concept of nation had not fully developed and
often was personalized in the form of a ruler or monarch. SANDMO, supra note 94, at 19. R
96 R.J. BARRY JONES, CONFLICT AND CONTROL IN THE WORLD ECONOMY: CONTEMPORARY
ECONOMIC REALISM AND NEO-MERCANTILISM 10 (1986).
97 SANDMO, supra note 94, at 19–20. R
98 See CANTERBERY, supra note 92, at 33. R
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kets—usually under the pretense of “colonization”—so that other European
nations could not trade with them.99
Mercantilist theories complemented and supported political thought in
Europe from the Renaissance to the Enlightenment.100 After several centuries
of dominance, however, their influence waned under the critical observa-
tions of persons with broader perspectives on trade and wealth, and particu-
larly under the criticisms of Adam Smith.101
Adam Smith roundly criticized mercantilism in The Wealth of Nations,
devoting an entire chapter to explaining the fallacies of the doctrine.102 His
most damning and lengthy observation criticized mercantilism’s confusion of
money and wealth: “I thought it necessary, though at the hazard of being
tedious, to examine at full length this popular notion, that wealth consists in
money, or in gold and silver . . . . [T]he wealth of a country consists not in
its gold and silver only, but in its lands, houses and consumable goods of all
kinds.”103 This fundamental misunderstanding became known as “the mer-
cantilist fallacy.”104
B. Neomercantilism
As E.K. Hunt has noted, political and economic systems tend to repeat
themselves.105 While the proponents of mercantilism no longer dominate po-
litical discourse, many of the tenets of mercantilist thought can still be dis-
cerned in policy debate and indeed in articulated policy.106 Because of their
similarity to the mercantilist thought several centuries past, this mode of
thought is often called neomercantilism.107
99 See id. at 34–37.
100 See E. DAMSGAARD HANSEN, EUROPEAN ECONOMIC HISTORY: FROM MERCANTILISM TO
MAASTRICHT AND BEYOND 59 (2001).
101 See MAGNUSSON, supra note 93, at 138–42 (discussing the decline of mercantilism). R
102 Id. at 25 (stating that Smith criticized mercantilism for confusing money with wealth);
J.A. La Nauze, The Substance of Adam Smith’s Attack on Mercantilism, in ADAM SMITH: CRIT-
ICAL ASSESSMENTS 55, 56 (John Cunningham Wood ed., 1984) (stating that Smith criticized
mercantilism for confusing money, especially in metal form, with wealth); see ADAM SMITH,
AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 187–98 (Adam &
Charles Black 1863) (1776).
103 SMITH, supra note 102, at 197. R
104 See Jacob H. Hollander, The Development of the Theory of Money from Adam Smith to
David Ricardo, 25 Q.J. ECON. 429, 438–40 (1910).
105 HUNT, supra note 93, at 39. R
106 See Stephen F. Diamond, The PetroChina Syndrome: Regulating Capital Markets in
the Anti-Globalization Era, 29 IOWA J. CORP. L. 39, 89–90 (2003) (identifying neomercantil-
ism as one of four principal modes of political thought that has emerged since the end of the
Cold War).
107 See Bjo¨rn Hettne, The Concept of Neomercantilism, in MERCANTILIST ECONOMICS 235,
236 (Lars Magnusson ed., 1993).
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Neomercantilist thought embraces a goal similar to that historically em-
braced by mercantilism: national prosperity through management of trade.108
Whereas, however, mercantilism arose in a period in which the embodiment
of a nation usually manifested itself in a monarch or ruler, neomercantilism
has arisen as the concept of nation becomes broader and more democratic.109
Countries no longer perceive wealth as the accumulation of gold but instead
as the accumulation of trade surpluses and the domination of global markets
by national businesses.110
Although neomercantilist thought has probably existed in some form
since the waning of mercantilism, it has exerted its most powerful influence
following the Second World War. In 1970, Harald Malmgren warned:
Today, we are seeing a resurgence of mercantilism, whereby gov-
ernments meet domestic economic demands with conscious poli-
cies of manipulation, passing the costs of these policies as much as
possible onto other countries. This neo-mercantilism is a pro-
foundly disruptive force in international relations.111
Currently, commentary on neomercantilism tends to focus on developing
and emerging economies;112 neomercantilism is not the official policy of the
108 See Clive Potter & Mark Tilzey, Agricultural Policy Discourses in the European Post-
Fordist Transition: Neoliberalism, Neomercantilism and Multifunctionality, 29 PROGRESS IN
HUM. GEOGRAPHY 581, 591 (2005).
109 Werner Raza, European Union Trade Politics: Pursuit of Neo-Mercantilism in Differ-
ent Arenas?, in STRATEGIC ARENA SWITCHING IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 67,
68–69 (Wolfgang Blaas & Joachim Becker eds., 2007).
110 See Paolo Guerrieri & Pier Carlo Padoan, Neomercantilism and International Eco-
nomic Stability, 40 INT’L ORG. 29, 30 (1986) (“The most pervasive definition of neomercantil-
ism is the pursuit of a current account surplus; namely, a persistent excess of exports over
imports.”). Countries utilize a variety of tools in pursuit of neomercantilist goals. Common
tools include manipulation of currency exchange rates, regulation of capital flow, and state
promotion of exports. Markus Kro¨ger, Neo-Mercantilist Capitalism and Post-2008 Cleavages
in Economic Decision-Making Power in Brazil, 33 THIRD WORLD Q. 887, 887 (2012). Ne-
omercantilist strategies, however, can also find expression in monetary policy, industrial pol-
icy, tax structure, labor rules, and any other rules through which a government can affect
markets. See R.J. BERRY JONES, CONFLICT AND CONTROL IN THE WORLD ECONOMY: CONTEM-
PORARY ECONOMIC REALISM AND NEO-MERCANTILISM 168–201 (1986).
111 Harald B. Malmgren, Coming Trade Wars? (Neo-Mercantilism and Foreign Policy),
FOREIGN POL’Y 115, 120 (1970). In 2012, Lucio Baccaro and Valentina Mele continue to warn
of the “twin challenges of protectionism . . . and neomercantilism.” Lucio Baccaro & Valen-
tina Mele, Pathology of Path Dependency? The ILO and the Challenge of New Governance, 65
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 195, 220 (2012).
112 See, e.g., Robert L. Kuttner, Development, Globalization, and Law, 26 MICH. J. INT’L
L. 19, 28 (2004) (noting China’s mixture of capitalism and neomercantilism); Paul Lansing &
Joseph Gabriella, Clarifying Gray Market Gray Areas, 31 AM. BUS. L.J. 313, 329–30 (1993)
(noting Japan’s historical practice of neomercantilism, developed from European system).
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United States.113 Nonetheless states, including the United States, may be
tempted to engage in neomercantilist practices.114
C. The Neomercantilist Fallacy
This Article is not concerned with whether the government of the
United States has adopted neomercantilist policies. Rather, this Article criti-
cizes neomercantilist thought in discussions and criticisms of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act. With respect to the type of activity contemplated in
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act’s definition of corruption, neomercantilist
thought is inherently fallacious. Just as mercantilism fundamentally misun-
derstood the actual world, so too does neomercantilism. Neomercantilism
perceives a world in which businesses are siloed by nationality. This percep-
tion does not accord with business reality. The neomercantilist fallacy is es-
pecially evident when viewed through the lens of the neomercantilist motif
in discussion and criticism of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
1. The Neomercantilist Fallacy: Business is Not Siloed
The mercantilist model is premised on an unspoken but critical assump-
tion: that the locus of a business can be identified with particularity and that
business transactions occur between identifiable business firms within iden-
tifiable locations.115 Neomercantilism attempts to increase national wealth by
focusing on “national” business firms.116 Critics and analysts of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act echo this, referring to “American” business firms and
the effects of the Act on those firms.117 Large business firms, however, are
rarely if ever siloed by political boundaries. The absence of siloing by politi-
cal boundaries is evident whether one examines either capital investment or
business activity. Neomercantilism also fails to understand the regulatory
environment in which business firms actually exist, a failure that is aptly
demonstrated through the global anticorruption regime.
113 See Michael Beckley, China’s Century? Why America’s Edge Will Endure, 36 INT’L
SEC. 41, 78 (contrasting the United States’ neoliberal policies with China’s neomercantilist
policies and suggesting the superiority of neoliberalism).
114 Howard W. Barnes, The Roots of Neomercantilism 10–11 (Ctr. for Int’l Bus. Educ. and
Research, Working Paper No. 92-12, 1992).
115 Charles E. Ziegler & Rajan Menon, Neomercantilism and Great-Power Energy Com-
petition in Central Asia and the Caspian, 8 STRATEGIC STUD. Q. 19, 19 (describing neomer-
cantilism as “economic nationalism”).
116 Christopher M. Dent, The New International Political Economy of East Asia and the
Developmental State, in DEVELOPMENTAL STATES: RELEVANCY, REDUNDANCY, OR RECON-
FIGURATION 79, 85 (Linda Low ed., 2004).
117 See supra notes 70–91 and accompanying text. R
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a. Capital Investment
Business firms do generate and accumulate wealth. But business firms
do not exist in isolation; almost all firms are embedded in a dynamic net-
work of capital relationships. Many entities exogenous to the business firm,
such as lenders or holders of debt or equity, have claims on some of the
wealth generated by business firms. These capital relationships are not siloed
within the borders of a country. As Stijn Claessens and Sergio Schmukler
explain:
Financial globalization has increased significantly during the last
decade. The increased integration of financial systems has in-
volved greater cross-border capital flows, tighter links among fi-
nancial markets, and greater presence of foreign financial firms
around the world. Indeed, many of the standard aggregate mea-
sures of financial globalization such as gross capital flows, stocks
of foreign assets and liabilities, and degree of co-movement of as-
set returns suggest that international financial integration has be-
come widespread and reached unprecedented levels.118
The extraordinary fluidity of capital raises a critical question about neomer-
cantilism and its criticism of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Where does
the wealth generated by a business firm go?
Neomercantilist critics of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act equate the
wealth of the United States with the competitiveness of discrete U.S. compa-
nies.119 Chris Sanchirico, however, asks a very pertinent question: “to what
extent are these ‘US’ companies owned by non-US investors?”120 Ultimately,
he cannot answer that question, in part because the capital market is ex-
tremely liquid and in part because foreign investment in U.S. business
firms121 may occur through brokerages or transfer agents who themselves are
located in the United States.122 After an exhaustive review of the available
information, however, Sanchirico suggests that commonly held theories of
118 Stijn Claessens & Sergio L. Schmukler, International Financial Integration Through
Equity Markets: Which Firms from Which Countries Go Global?, 26 J. INT’L MONEY & FIN.
788, 788–89 (2007); see Matthew C. Turk, Reframing International Financial Regulation After
the Global Financial Crisis: Rational States and Interdependence, Not Regulatory Networks
and Soft Law, 36 MICH. J. INT’L L. 59, 66–76 (2014) (noting that “since the 1960s, there has
been a steady trend of cross-border integration of financial markets” and providing a lengthy
history of “the crazy-quilt of international regulatory institutions, dynamism of international
financial integration, and variety of financial crises”). For further discussion of the term
“globalization,” see infra notes 134–141 and accompanying text. R
119 See supra notes 70–91 and accompanying text. R
120 Chris William Sanchirico, As American as Apple Inc.: International Tax and Owner-
ship Nationality, 68 TAX L. REV. 207, 210 (2015).
121 Sanchirico places quotation marks around the term “U.S.” when referring to these
business firms because he finds the location of the beneficiaries of these firms to be indetermi-
nate. See id. at 210–11. Although this article accepts Sanchirico’s conclusions, this article will
continue to use the term U.S. when discussing firms domiciled in the United States.
122 Id. at 273.
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non-U.S. investment probably underestimate the amount of foreign invest-
ment in the United States and that the amount of foreign investment is prob-
ably extensive.123
Sanchirico does not ask, but the obverse question is just as important:
to what extent do U.S. investors benefit from investment in “non-U.S.”
businesses? The precise answer to this question is as elusive as the answer to
Sanchirico’s original question. In any case, however, the value of capital
relationships abroad is enormous; the Bureau of Economic Analysis esti-
mates that as of the third quarter of 2014, more than twenty-four trillion
dollars was invested abroad by entities in the United States.124
Corporate inversions illustrate the difficulty in distinguishing between
“U.S.” and “foreign” firms from the perspective of beneficial capital rela-
tionships. A corporate inversion occurs when a corporation incorporated
under the laws of the United States either merges with or becomes a subsidi-
ary of a business firm incorporated outside of the United States and then
nominally relocates its headquarters outside of the United States, usually for
purposes of lowering effective taxes.125 A corporate inversion has no effect
on the operation of a firm.126 A corporate inversion does not affect a corpora-
tion’s ability to sell shares on U.S. exchanges or to raise other forms of
capital in the United States.127 Indeed, “[f]rom an economic point of view,
the only change is that the publicly traded entity suddenly became ‘for-
eign.’” 128 Burger King, for example, employed an inversion in 2014 and
relocated its nominal headquarters to Canada, rendering Burger King a for-
eign corporation.129 Not one of the Burger King restaurants, however, moved
overseas as a consequence of the inversion; there are still more than seven
thousand Burger King restaurants in the United States.130 Moreover, the ben-
123 Id. at 233–37; see Marcel Fratzscher, Capital Flows, Push Versus Pull Factors and the
Global Financial Crisis, 7 J. INT’L ECON. 341, 341 (2011) (noting that despite predictions that
capital flow into the United States would dwindle after the financial collapse, “capital of do-
mestic and foreign investors flow[ed] massively into the US assets between July 2008 and
April 2009”).
124 U.S. Net International Investment Position: End of Third Quarter 2012, BUREAU OF
ECON. ANALYSIS, http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/international/intinv/intinvnewsrelease.htm
[http://perma.cc/N53F-G7YP] (last modified Sept. 29, 2015).
125 Victor Fleischer, Brand New Deal: The Branding Effect of Corporate Deal Structures,
104 MICH. L. REV. 1581, 1621 (2006).
126 See id. (“Inversion deals are little more than a shuffling of corporate pa-
pers . . . . [They] do[ ] not require any substantive change in the company’s operations, such
as a relocation of factories, employees, or even corporate headquarters.”); Tyler M. Dumler,
Changing Less to Make More: The Causes and Effects of Lowering the Corporate Tax Rate, 13
U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 88, 96 (2012) (“[T]he result is an operationally unaltered
corporation.”).
127 Orsolya Kun, Corporate Inversions: The Interplay of Tax, Corporate, and Economic
Implications, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 313, 329 (2004).
128 Omri Marian, Jurisdiction to Tax Corporations, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1613, 1655 (2013).
129 Samuel C. Thompson Jr., The Cat-and-Mouse Inversion Game With Burger King, 144
TAX NOTES 1317, 1318 (2014).
130 BURGER KING, BURGER KING WORLDWIDE REPORTS FOURTH QUARTER AND FULL
YEAR 2013 RESULTS 1, 2 (Feb. 13, 2014), http://investor.rbi.com/~/media/Files/B/BurgerKing-
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eficial capital structure of Burger King did not change in a meaningful
way.131 The wealth of neither Canada nor the United States has meaningfully
been affected by changes to the “U.S.-ness” or “Canadianess” of Burger
King.132 What neomercantilists might score as a loss has, in reality, almost
no effect on wealth in the United States or Canada.
The liquidity of capital undermines the empirical vitality of nationalist
concepts such as neomercantilism, and the precision of a neomercantilist
analysis. Neomercantilism—like mercantilism—postulates zero-sum com-
petition: some firms “win” and investors in those firms are enriched, some
firms do not win and investors in those firms are not enriched.133 Neomer-
cantilism embraces a goal of enriching domestic constituents, through “win-
ning” in the global market. When a U.S. firm wins, however, it is not at all
clear that domestic constituents are those who are enriched. Moreover, even
if the zero-sum hypothesis were true, when that U.S. firm wins in the place
of a non-U.S. firm, it would be quite likely that many U.S. constituents lose
an opportunity for enrichment. Neomercantilist analyses simply do not re-
flect the reality of global capital liquidity.
b. The Reality of the Business Context
Neomercantilist premises also bear little resemblance to the actual
world that transnational business inhabits. Neomercantilist critics of the For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act appear ignorant of globalization. The term
“globalization” is widely used in legal literature but only poorly defined.134
David Law, drawing on a variety of sources, notes that globalization:
typically refers to both a process of change and a resulting set of
conditions: it is a process by which “technological, economic, and
political innovations . . . have drastically reduced the barriers to
economic, political, and cultural exchange,” resulting in not only
“increasing transnational flows and increasingly thick networks of
IR/documents/legacy-filings/fourth-quarter-and-full-year-2013-results.pdf [http://perma.cc/
KX4R-B6KM].
131 Thompson, supra note 129, at 1317. R
132 The U.S. government will collect less money in tax payments from Burger King, which
is the reason companies undertake inversions. Joshua Simpson, Analyzing Corporate Inver-
sions and Proposed Changes to the Repatriation Rule, 68 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 673,
678–79 (2013).
133 Ziegler & Menon, supra note 115, at 20 (“In contrast to the variable-sum logic of R
liberalism, neomercantilism rests on the zero-sum premise . . . .”).
134 See Carl Landauer, Regionalism, Geography, and the International Legal Imagination,
11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 557, 571 (2011) (describing “an immense amount of debate over the defini-
tion as well as the stakes of globalization”); Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Private Regula-
tory Governance: Ambiguities of Public Authority and Private Power, 76 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 117, 121 (2013) (“[T]he term still operates as a conundrum, as a term depicting an
analytical and conceptual framework grounded in several disciplines and discourses at once,
and as such resists a clear definition.”).
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interdependence,” but also an expansion of the “scale on which
power is organized and exercised.”135
The boundaries of any particular business entity do not necessarily coincide
with boundaries that designate countries, and the relationships in which busi-
nesses engage often pay scant attention to those borders as well. “Globaliza-
tion entails increasingly numerous transnational interactions.”136
Steve Kobrin observes a fundamental failure in legally-oriented analy-
ses of transnational business to comprehend the reality of transnational busi-
ness: whereas the law conceives of “a transnational firm as ‘stringing
together corporations created by the laws of different states,’” a perspective
oriented in business reality “emphasize[s] control exercised by the center
over the enterprise as a whole.”137 Kobrin and others have written exten-
sively on businesses’ abilities to organize and to form relationships in the
world as it exists rather than the world envisioned by law:
Borders are “transcended” rather than crossed, relations become
increasingly “supraterritorial” as distance, borders and geographic
space itself lose economic and political significance. Markets no
longer need to be defined in terms of geographic proximity and, in
some instances, the location of transactions and organizations has
become indeterminate.138
Gary Gerrefi’s observation of how globalization affects production contrasts
sharply with neomercantilist thinking: “Firms are less likely simply to make
products and export them; they increasingly participate in highly complex
cross-border arrangements that involve a wide array of partners, customers
and suppliers.”139 It is important, in a discussion of laws, to understand that
business scholars are not attacking the concept of legal sovereignty.140 A
sovereign nation is still a sovereign nation, with dominion over that which
occurs inside its borders. It is simply that in actual business practice “state
135 David S. Law, Globalization and the Future of Constitutional Rights, 102 NW. U. L.
REV. 1277, 1278 (2008) (citations omitted); see also Annette Burkeen, Private Ordering and
Institutional Choice: Defining the Role of Multinational Corporations in Promoting Global
Labor Standards, 6 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 205, 218 (2007) (stating that “the in-
creased economic interdependence of the international community” is one aspect of
globalization).
136 Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping System, 96 CORNELL L. REV.
481, 495–96 (2011).
137 Stephen J. Kobrin, Private Political Authority and Public Responsibility: Transnational
Politics, Transnational Firms, and Human Rights, 19 BUS. ETHICS Q. 349, 356 (2009) (cita-
tions omitted).
138 Stephen J. Kobrin, Globalization, Transnational Corporations and the Future of
Global Governance, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON GLOBAL CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP 249,
250 (Andreas Georg Scherer & Guido Palazzo eds., 2008) (citations omitted).
139 GARY GEREFFI, THE NEW OFFSHORING OF JOBS AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT: AN
OVERVIEW OF THE CONTEMPORARY GLOBAL LABOR MARKET 2 (2005).
140 See Kobrin, supra note 137, at 361 (“While the system is no longer state centric, states R
remain the most powerful actors and are not likely to cede sovereignty . . . .”).
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borders define less and less the boundaries of corporate thinking or
practice.”141
The automobile industry provides a convenient illustration. Ford Motor
Company is considered by many to be the quintessential “American” busi-
ness firm, while Toyota Motor Corporation fills the same role in Japan.142
Common shares of Ford are listed on the New York Stock Exchange, and
also on exchanges in Belgium and France.143 Sanchirico’s research suggests
that identifying the nationality of holders of shares of Ford would be difficult
but it is very likely that shares are held by persons and institutions outside of
the United States.144 Ford is headquartered in the United States, in Dearborn,
Michigan, but “maintain[s] and operate[s] manufacturing plants, assembly
facilities, parts distribution centers, and engineering centers” throughout the
world.145 In addition to these wholly-owned or controlled operations, Ford
engages in joint ventures in several countries.146
The components that are assembled into a complete Ford automobile
come from many different countries. As with ownership of Ford shares, it is
very difficult to accurately assess the sources of automobile components.
After a two year study to determine the sources of components, a consumer
information group concluded “[i]n today’s global economy, there’s no easy
way to determine just how American a car is.”147  They estimated, however,
that approximately forty percent of the components used to build some of
Ford’s vehicles come from outside of the United States.148
Japan embraces a mercantilist orientation far more explicitly than does
the United States.149 Toyota Motor Corporation’s reality, however, differs
141 Samuel Palmisano, The Globally Integrated Enterprise, 85 FOR. AFF. 127, 129 (2006).
142 See Henry H. Drummonds, Transnational Small and Emerging Business in a World of
Nikes and Microsofts, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 249, 255 (2000) (describing Ford
Motor Company as “quintessentially American”); Matthew Senechal, Reforming the Japanese
Commercial Code: A Step Towards an American-Style Executive Officer System in Japan, 12
PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 535, 556 n.197 (2003) (describing Toyota “as one of Japan’s most
traditional ‘Japanese’ firms”).
143 Ford Motor Company, Annual Report (Form 10-K) 26 (Feb. 13, 2015) [hereinafter
Ford Annual Report], http://corporate.ford.com/content/dam/corporate/en/investors/reports-
and-filings/Annual%20Reports/2014-ford-annual-report.pdf [http://perma.cc/63KC-WUQZ].
144 See Sanchirico, supra note 120, at 233–37 (concluding that although it is difficult to R
determine the amount of foreign investment in shares of U.S. firms, that amount is probably
extensive). At the time this article was written, institutional investors holding shares of Ford
included Allianz Asset Management AG, Norges Bank, Deutsche Bank, APG Asset Manage-
ment N.V., HSBC Holdings PLC, Sumitomo Mitsui Trust, and AXA, all of which are domi-
ciled outside of the United States. See Nasdaq, Ford Motor Company Institutional Ownership
(Nov. 10, 2015), http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/f/institutional-holdings [http://perma.cc/
8FAB-3BCQ].
145 Ford Annual Report, supra note 143, at 21; see also id., Exhibit 21: Subsidiaries of R
Ford Motor Company as of January 31, 2015 (listing subsidiaries of Ford).
146 Ford Annual Report, supra note 143, at 21-22. R
147 Kelsey Mays, The Cars.com American-Made Index, CARS.COM, http://www.cars.com/
go/advice/Story.jsp?section=top&subject=ami&story=amMade0611 [http://perma.cc/UN3S-
62KS].
148 Id.
149 Lansing & Gabriella, supra note 112, at 330. R
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only marginally from that of Ford. As is Ford, Toyota is a publicly traded
corporation, with shares listed not only on the Tokyo Stock Exchange but
also on the London Stock Exchange and the New York Stock Exchange.150
Toyota itself suggests that almost a third of the shares of Toyota are owned
by persons or entities outside of Japan, although that estimate is subject to
the same uncertainties as with Ford.151
Toyota is headquartered in Toyota City, Japan, but has subsidiaries,
branches, and offices throughout the world.152 Toyota assembles many
thousands of automobiles in the United States through its wholly-owned
subsidiaries.153 Although the components used to assemble the automobiles
come from many places, many come from the United States; indeed, a con-
sumer information group evaluates Toyota’s Camry as having the most U.S.-
sourced components—more, for example, than any automobile manufac-
tured by Ford.154
Ford and Toyota keep meticulous financial records, for the purposes of
making required disclosures to shareholders and reporting tax obligations.
Their financial records are kept, however, to fulfill those exact obligations
and not for the purpose of keeping a neomercantilist scorecard. No such
scorecard exists. Ford and Toyota’s reality raises several interesting questions
regarding the identification of businesses and business transactions with par-
ticular countries. If, for example, a Toyota automobile is assembled and sold
in the United States, to what country should that transaction be assigned?
The good itself did not leave the United States, but many of the physical
parts that make up the vehicle, as well as much of the intellectual property
and the technology that went into making that vehicle did come to the
United States from someplace else. The revenue generated by that sale will
accrue to a company incorporated and domiciled in the United States, but
that company, and its revenue, is subject to the control of an entity outside of
the United States. Similarly, Ford Motor Company accrues revenue from
sources throughout the world. Much of that money will never enter the
United States, either physically or in account form. Wherever located in the
world, that money does fall within the control, directly or indirectly, of a
corporation headquartered in the United States. That corporation, however,
has fiduciary duties to thousands of other entities, located in an ever-chang-
ing number of countries, and many of those duties directly relate to the con-
trol and disposal of that revenue. It is virtually impossible to state with
particularity what country has been made wealthy by the sale of a vehicle.
150 Stock Overview, TOYOTA MOTOR CO., http://www.toyota-global.com/investors/stock_
information_ratings/outline.html [http://perma.cc/WVG9-NJLU].
151 Id.
152 TOYOTA MOTOR CO., TOYOTA IN THE WORLD 2013 11–17 (2013), http://www.toyota-
global.com/company/profile/in_the_world/pdf/2013/databook_en_2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/
M2HN-4S7S].
153 Id. at 12.
154 Mays, supra note 147. R
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Proponents of neomercantilism envision national firms championing a
nation’s economic cause, whose successes contribute directly to a nation’s
economic well-being.155 That vision does not comport with the world in
which transnational business firms operate. Analyses of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act premised on notions of affecting the competitiveness of U.S.
business firms have little resonance with reality.
2. The Neomercantilist Fallacy: A Regulatory Web
The 1988 amendments to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act called for
the creation of an international anticorruption regime.156 That call has been
robustly answered.157 The regime manifests itself in many intertwined ways.
The domestic law components of this regime garner much attention, but the
rules of private dispute resolution and the administrative processes of inter-
national organs also affect and constrain the activities of business firms. The
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act cannot be analyzed as if it applies to all types
of business behavior. Its definition of corruption renders it applicable only to
bribery that relates to transnational business. This is exactly the behavior that
falls within the reach of other strands of the anticorruption regime. There-
fore, any business firm that is affected by the Act is, by definition, also
affected by the global regime. To analyze the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
as if it and only it affected U.S. business firms is meaningless.
a. Domestic Law
More than fifty countries outlaw the payment of bribes to foreign gov-
ernment officials.158 These laws are often enacted in response to require-
ments imposed by an international organization.159 The first of these was the
Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, promulgated by the Organi-
zation of American States in 1996.160 Interestingly Venezuela, rocked by the
corruption-abetted failures of several large banks, pushed the treaty through
155 See Sanchirico, supra note 120, at 211 (describing the logic of nationalist arguments). R
156 See supra notes 63–66 and accompanying text. R
157 See Maggie Gardner, Channeling Unilateralism, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 297, 326–29
(2015) (describing the role of the United States in creating the global regime); Philip
M. Nichols, George J. Siedel & Matthew Kasdin, Corruption as a Pan-Cultural Phenomenon:
An Empirical Study in Countries at Opposite Ends of the Former Soviet Empire, 39 TEX.
INT’L L.J. 215, 216 (2004) (describing creation of the global regime).
158 Nichols, supra note 55, at 362. R
159 See Matt A. Vega, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Culture of Bribery: Expanding the
Scope of Private Whistleblower Suits to Overseas Employees, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 425, 435
(2009) (“Although the conventions set out general international standards, each member state
is expected to unilaterally legislate and enforce its own national anti-bribery laws.”).
160 Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention Against Corruption,
Mar. 29, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 724 [hereinafter Inter-American Convention]; see Marian Nash,
Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 92 AM. J. INT’L L.
491, 491 (1998) (noting that the treaty is the first of its kind).
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the Organization rather than the United States.161 The Inter-American Treaty
requires members of the Organization of American States to criminalize
transnational bribery, in a manner similar to that of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, and also requires signatories to cooperate with one another in
the investigation, apprehension, and prosecution of persons and entities that
pay bribes.162 Pursuant to the Inter-American Convention, transnational brib-
ery soon became illegal throughout almost the entirety of the Western
Hemisphere.163
As foreseen by the United States Senate, the Organization of Economic
Cooperation and Development’s Convention on Combating Bribery of For-
eign Public Officials in International Business Transactions,164 promulgated
shortly after the Inter-American Convention, transformed the regime in
which transnational business is conducted.165 While the United States took a
stronger leadership role, a spate of devastating corruption scandals as well as
the specter of endemic corruption in newly-liberated Eastern Europe spurred
European and Japanese engagement with the issue of corruption control.166
The OECD requires members to criminalize transnational bribery and to re-
port on their progress in enacting and enforcing laws against bribery.167 Sig-
nificantly, members of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and
Development—the “rich democracies club”—account for more than sixty
percent of global domestic product, are involved in more than three quarters
of all international trade and investment transactions around the world, and
provide more than ninety-five percent of developmental aid.168 International
trade and investment are precisely the environments in which business firms
affected by the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act operate.
Although progenitor and preeminent, the Inter-American Convention
and the OECD Convention do not constitute the totality of international
161 Bruce Zagaris & Shaila Lakhana Ohri, The Emergence of an International Enforce-
ment Regime on Transnational Corruption in the Americas, 30 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 53, 65
(1998).
162 See Developments in the Law—International Criminal Law: Corporate Liability for
Violations of International Human Rights Law, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2025, 2032 (2001).
163 Mark, supra note 60, at 501. R
164 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Convention on Combating
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Nov. 21, 1997, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 105-43, 37 I.L.M. 1 (1998) [hereinafter OECD Convention].
165 See Beverley Earle & Anita Cava, When Is a Bribe Not a Bribe? A Re-Examination of
the FCPA in Light of Business Reality, 23 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 111, 142 (2013)
(describing the “sea change” in attitudes toward bribery wrought by the OECD convention);
Hess & Dunfee, supra note 57, at 602 (describing the OECD Convention as constituting the R
“most significant advancement in the fight against corruption and the strongest demonstration
of its universal condemnation”).
166 Philip M. Nichols, The Myth of Anti-Bribery Laws as Transnational Intrusion, 33 COR-
NELL INT’L L.J. 627, 639–40 (2000).
167 Margaret Ryznar & Samer Korkor, Anti-Bribery Legislation in the United States and
United Kingdom: A Comparative Analysis of Scope and Sentencing, 76 MO. L. REV. 415, 421
(2011).
168 What is the OECD?, U.S. MISSION TO THE ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV.,
http://usoecd.usmission.gov/mission/overview.html [http://perma.cc/BA29-GUS4].
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agreements requiring members to criminalize transnational bribery. The Af-
rican Union, the Council of Europe, and the European Union have each
agreed to similar requirements.169 More recently, the United Nations has
promulgated a Convention Against Corruption, which requires signatories to
criminalize transnational bribery.170 Few of the more than 140 countries that
have signed the Convention have yet enacted laws pursuant to the Conven-
tion, but over time the Convention will only increase the number of coun-
tries that criminalize transnational bribery.171 While once only the United
States and Sweden prohibited bribery of foreign government officials, now
the prohibition is ubiquitous and soon it may be universal.172
Some scholars have commented, approvingly or disapprovingly, on the
broad reach of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.173 Many of the laws en-
acted by other countries, however, reach as far or even farther.174 Elizabeth
Spahn argues that these laws, therefore, must be understood dynamically and
interactively, as a framework of ubiquitous, overlapping, far-reaching rules
in which “[e]nforcement competition mixed with enforcement cooperation
play the central roles.”175 At least with respect to corruption, this web under-
mines another neomercantilist assumption: that a country solely controls the
regulatory regime in which its business firms operate.176 A business firm
constrained by the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act is by definition constrained
by the global regime, and the Act must be analyzed in that context.
169 African Union, Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, July 11, 2003,
43 I.L.M. 5; Council of Europe, Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, Jan. 27, 1999,
E.T.S. No. 173, 38 I.L.M. 505.
170 United Nations, Convention Against Corruption, arts. 15–20, Oct. 31, 2003, 2349
U.N.T.S. 41, 43 I.L.M. 37.
171 See Thomas R. Snider & Won Kidane, Combating Corruption Through International
Law in Africa: A Comparative Analysis, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 691, 747–48 (2007) (describ-
ing the African Union’s convention as a critical starting point); Elizabeth K. Spahn, Implement-
ing Global Anti-Bribery Norms: From the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to the OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention to the U.N. Convention Against Corruption, 23 IND. INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 1, 11–12 (2013) (describing trends toward enactment and enforcement).
172 See Nichols, supra note 55, at 362 (discussing increases in the number of countries R
criminalizing transnational bribery).
173 See H. Lowell Brown, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Under the 1998 Amendments to the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Does the Government’s Reach Now Exceed its Grasp?, 26
N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 239, 302–58 (2001) (exhaustively reviewing arguments for and
against the jurisdictional reach of the Act).
174 Nichols, supra note 55, at 363–64. R
175 Elizabeth Spahn, Multi-Jurisdictional Bribery Law Enforcement: The OECD Anti-Brib-
ery Convention, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 43 (2012).
176 Kobrin makes a similar point more generally. “While [multinational enterprises] are,
in theory, responsive to all the national jurisdictions in which they operate, in practice, none
has complete control either singly or collectively. No single territorial state has sufficient in-
formation to fully understand the operations of a [multinational enterprise]. Furthermore, au-
thority cannot be summoned across jurisdictions; each nation attempting to regulate the
[multinational enterprise] through the portion ‘residing’ within its borders may not provide
sufficient leverage over the firm as a whole to provide leverage.” Stephen J. Kobrin, Sovereign
ty@Bay: Globalization, Multinational Enterprise, and the International Political System, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 181, 186 (Alan M. Rugman & Thomas
L. Brewer eds., 2001).
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b. Private Resolution of Disputes
Business behavior is not bounded only by the anti-corruption web of
domestic criminal laws. Private resolution of business disputes in arbitration
fora also invokes rules against bribery. In 1963, well before the Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act came into effect, Judge Gunnar Lagergren observed that:
Whether one is taking the point of view of good governance or
that of commercial ethics it is impossible to close one’s eyes to the
probable destination of amounts of this magnitude, and to the de-
structive effect thereof on the business pattern with consequent im-
pairment of industrial progress. Such corruption is an international
evil; it is contrary to good morals and to international public policy
common to the community of nations.177
Commercial actors who pay bribes, therefore, according to Judge Lagergren
“have forfeited any right to ask for assistance of the machinery of jus-
tice.”178 In other words, Lagergren felt that those who pay bribes may not
even appear before an international tribunal to seek enforcement of their
contracts.
More recently, relying on the principle that agreements to arbitrate are
separable from otherwise unenforceable contracts, arbitration tribunals have
exercised jurisdiction over disputes in which bribery is alleged.179 This is not
good news for business firms that pay bribes. In language only slightly more
restrained than that of Judge Lagergren, the arbitration panel in World Duty
Free Company Ltd. v. Republic of Kenya ruled that:
[B]ribery is contrary to the international public policy of most, if
not all, States or, to use another formula, to transnational public
policy. Thus, claims based on contracts of corruption or on con-
tracts obtained by corruption cannot be upheld by this Arbitral
Tribunal.180
Put simply, arbitration tribunals will not uphold contracts tainted by
bribery.181
177 ICC Case No. 1110, Award, ¶ 20 (1963), reprinted in 10 ARB. INT’L 282, 294 (1994).
178 Id. ¶ 23, 10 INT’L ARB. at 294.
179 J. Gillis Wetter, Issues of Corruption before International Arbitral Tribunals: The Au-
thentic Text and True Meaning of Judge Gunnar Lagergren’s 1963 Award in ICC Case No.
1110, 10 ARB. INT’L 277, 278 (1994).
180 World Duty Free Company Ltd. v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/00/7, Award, ¶ 157 (Oct. 4, 2006), http://italaw.com/documents/WDFv.KenyaAward.pdf
[http://perma.cc/V33X-NH82].
181 W. Laurence Craig, Conflict and Cooperation: The Arbitrator’s Mission and the Appli-
cation of Law in International Commercial Arbitration, 21 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 243, 276
(2010).
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International tribunals also actively engage in the regulation of brib-
ery.182 International tribunals investigate and rule upon allegations of corrup-
tion in any transaction in dispute.183 Tribunals may, in fact, investigate the
possibility of corruption on their own initiative; if they do not do so and the
existence of corruption is later demonstrated, a tribunal’s decision may le-
gally be set aside by a national court.184 If a tribunal finds that a contract was
procured through corrupt means, then under current doctrine in international
arbitration that contract is either unenforceable or is voidable at the request
of the innocent party.185
This has serious consequences for business firms engaged in transna-
tional activities. It is of course impossible to determine with precision, but
evidence suggests that almost all transnational business contracts entered
into by business firms with a relationship to the United States contain arbi-
tration clauses.186 Allegations of bribery “are the leading ground for invok-
ing the principle” in arbitration that any given contract should not be
enforced on public policy grounds.187 There is also a growing consensus
among arbitration tribunals that incidents of bribery must be reported to na-
tional authorities.188
These rules are generated by bodies other than the federal government
of the United States. Their impact, however, on business firms engaged in
transnational activities—the exact business activities targeted by the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act—is no less significant. That the Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act is a criminal law while international arbitration is not has little
bearing on any purported effects on competitiveness. If the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act were to vanish, business firms—including U.S. business
firms—would still be constrained by the rules of international arbitration.
There are of course U.S. business firms that will never appear before an
international arbitration tribunal, but those same business firms also fall
outside of the definitional boundaries of the Act. To analyze the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act without taking the rules of international arbitration
into account makes little sense.
182 See Catherine A. Rogers, Secrecy and Transparency in Dispute Resolution: Trans-
parency in International Commercial Arbitration, 54 KAN. L. REV. 1301, 1332 (2006)
(describing the roles of tribunals).
183 GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 218 (2009).
184 Bernardo Cremades & David Cairns, Transnational Public Policy in International Ar-
bitral Decision-Making: The Cases of Bribery, Money Laundering, and Fraud, in ARBITRA-
TION, MONEY LAUNDERING, CORRUPTION AND FRAUD 65, 67 (Kristine Karsten & Andrew
Berkeley eds., 2003).
185 Craig, supra note 181, at 26. R
186 See CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL & RICHARD W. NAIMARK, TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: COLLECTED EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 59 (2005) (stating that al-
most ninety percent of these contracts contain arbitration clauses).
187 Gordon Kaiser, Corruption in the Energy Sector: Criminal Fines, Civil Judgments, and
Lost Arbitrations, 34 ENERGY L.J. 193, 201 (2013).
188 Rogers, supra note 182, at 1332. R
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c. Administrative Rules and Processes
Administrative rules and processes also form boundaries for business
behavior, and these too impose constraints on bribery. These rules and
processes occur at the national and international level. At the national level,
many countries have rules that prohibit a person or business firm that has
engaged in bribery from entering into further business relationships with that
government.189 The federal government of the United States debars bribe-
paying businesses or persons from entering into any transactions with the
United States.190 The process specifically identifies bribes that fall within the
definition of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as grounds for debarment.191
The central government of China also debars bribe-paying businesses and
persons from any government relations, as does the European Union.192
International organs also promulgate rules that constrain bribery. The
World Bank Group, for example, which consists of the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development, the International Finance Corporation,
the International Development Association, the International Centre for Set-
tlement of Investment Disputes, and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee
Agency, investigates claims of bribery in any project that involves one of its
organs.193 Indeed, an entire division of the World Bank—the Integrity Vice
Presidency—is dedicated to reviewing and holding hearings on such
claims.194 If a claim of bribery is verified, then the responsible person or firm
is placed on an embargo list and may not become involved in any project
involving the World Bank Group.195 The International Monetary Fund and
each of the Regional Development Banks have similar processes, and main-
tain similar lists; reciprocal agreements among these institutions result in
cross-debarment.196 Paul Carrington describes these processes as a form of
189 See DICK THORNBURGH, RONALD L. GAINER & CUYLER H. WALKER, REPORT CON-
CERNING THE DEBARMENT PROCESSES OF THE WORLD BANK 3 (2002), http://siteresources
.worldbank.org/PROCUREMENT/Resources/thornburghreport.pdf [http://perma.cc/V3RZ-
79NC] (stating that debarment “is commonly employed by victims [of corruption] that are
national government agencies”).
190 Federal Acquisitions Regulations System—Causes for Debarment, 48 C.F.R. § 9.406-2
(2014); see Pascale He´le`ne Dubois, Domestic and International Administrative Tools to Com-
bat Fraud & Corruption: A Comparison of U.S. Suspension and Debarment with the World
Bank’s Sanctions System, 2012 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 195, 198–216 (2012) (describing and analyz-
ing the federal debarment process).
191 Victor E. Schwartz & Phil Goldberg, Carrots and Sticks: Placing Rewards as Well as
Punishment in Regulatory and Tort Law, 51 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 315, 322 (2014).
192 Council Directive 2004/17/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 134); Council Directive 2004/18/EC, sec-
tion 2, arts. 45, 1(b) O.J. (L 134); Tong Xinchao, Chinese Procurement Law: Current Legal
Frameworks and a Transition to the World Trade Organization’s Government Procurement
Agreement, 17 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 139, 163–64 (2003) (describing debarment in China).
193 See Dubois, supra note 190, at 216–34 (describing and analyzing the international R
financial institutions’ debarment process).
194 See id. at 218–26  (describing the Integrity Vice Presidency and the process).
195 Sope Williams, The Debarment of Corrupt Contractors from World Bank-Financed
Contracts, 36 PUB. CONTRACT L.J. 277, 278 (2007).
196 Dubois, supra note 190, at 232. R
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enforcement of the international regime by international financial
institutions.197
It is important to note that these rules were not created for the purpose
of singling out particular businesses nor for expressing outrage or indigna-
tion. Rather, these rules were created for the purpose of strengthening mar-
kets.198 It is also important to note that these rules matter in the world in
which business firms actually operate. The federal government of the United
States claims to be the largest purchaser of goods and services in the world,
China is not far behind, the European Union spends billions of Euros each
year, and those are only three examples.199 Similarly, the members of the
World Bank Group constitute significant economic actors in transnational
business, particularly with respect to emerging economies.200 Their enforce-
ment of the global antibribery regime “have not been without effect on busi-
ness practices.”201
As with private dispute settlement rules, any argument that the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act imposes criminal penalties while the rules of interna-
tional organizations are only administrative misses the point. The neomer-
cantilist mode of thought assumes that a polity can control the
competitiveness of “its” business firms. In the case of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, however, that does not seem to be true. The Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act is only one strand in a tapestry that includes, among other
things, administrative rules and processes promulgated by entities other than
the United States.
197 Paul D. Carrington, Qui Tam: Is False Claims Law a Model for International Law?, 27
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 27, 40 (2012).
198 See Hans-Joachim Priess, Questionable Assumptions: The Case for Updating the Sus-
pension and Debarment Regimes at the Multilateral Development Banks, 45 GEO. WASH. INT’L
L. REV. 271, 277–78 (2013) (noting that the World Bank Group rules were promulgated to
enhance open and fair competition, to reduce trade barriers, to protect public interest in public
funds, and to enhance governance); Jessica Tillipman, Suspension and Debarment: The Con-
gressional War on Contractors, 45 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 235, 236 (2013) (noting that the
federal rules were created to ensure that the government supported responsible economic
actors).
199 See CONSOLIDATED ANNUAL ACCOUNTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 2013 61 (July 30,
2014) (reporting net operating expenses of C=139,426,000,000); Gil Lan, American Legal Re-
alism Goes to China: The China Puzzle and Law Reform, 51 AM. BUS. L.J. 365, 366 (2014)
(noting that China is the second largest economy behind the United States); SBA’s Role in
Government Contracting, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., https://www.sba.gov/content/sbas-role-
government-contracting  [http://perma.cc/E325-DJQH] (claiming that the U.S. federal govern-
ment is “[t]he world’s largest buyer of goods and services”).
200 See Jeehye You, Legislative Reform of the Kaesong Industrial Complex in North Ko-
rea, 29 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 36, 67 (2011) (“Among international organizations, the World
Bank has performed the most active role in assisting developing countries.”).
201 Carrington, supra note 197, at 40. R
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VI. THE NEOMERCANTILIST MOTIF DISTORTS ANALYSIS OF THE
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
Evaluation of the neomercantilist mode of thinking is not simply an
intellectual exercise. The neomercantilist mode of thinking distorts analysis
of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and could lead to errant or fruitless
policy initiatives. Three examples illustrate how the neomercantilist motif
can distort analysis of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. The first is the
facilitating payments exception, the second is a proposal for a defense based
on implementation of comprehensive compliance programs, and the third is
a proposal that portions of fines and settlements accrued pursuant to prose-
cution of the Act be used to fund anticorruption programs in the countries in
which the bribery occurred.
The facilitating payments exception illustrates the distortions intro-
duced by a neomercantilist analysis of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
Facilitating payments are bribes paid to secure routine, non-discretionary
government action such as securing a telephone line in a normal amount of
time or obtaining a clerk’s stamp on a document.202 The Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act excepts facilitating payments from its jurisdiction.203
Lindsey Hills observes that, unlike the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
the United Kingdom’s corresponding Bribery Act does not except facilitating
payments.204 Hills argues, from an anglo-centric neomercantilist perspective,
that “the lack of exception under the [United Kingdom Bribery Act] causes
U.K. companies to be placed at a competitive disadvantage.”205 Hills goes on
to decry the “disastrously large discrepancy” between the laws of the United
Kingdom and the United States.206
Hills’s analysis errs in at least two ways. First, Hills’s implicit assump-
tion that U.S. and British business firms are siloed within the United States
and the United Kingdom fundamentally misunderstands both the reality of
business and the nature of the international anticorruption regime. The Brit-
ish law “has been viewed as a broader and tougher foreign anti-bribery law
than its United States’ counterpart.”207 In particular, the jurisdictional reach
of the Bribery Act is broad, and extends even to firms that merely conduct
202 Sarah Bartle, Chris Chamberlain & Brian Wohlberg, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 51
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1265, 1283 (2014).
203 Murphy, supra note 18, at 239 (“The most well known FCPA exception is for so-called R
‘facilitating’ or ‘grease’ payments to low-level foreign officials who perform ‘routine govern-
mental actions.’”).
204 Lindsey Hills, Universal Anti-Bribery Legislation Can Save International Business: A
Comparison of the FCPA and the UKBA in an Attempt to Create Universal Legislation to
Combat Bribery Around the Globe, 13 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 469, 476 (2014).
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Jon Jordan, The Adequate Procedures Defense Under the UK Bribery Act: A British
Idea for the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 17 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 25, 28 (2011).
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some business activity in the United Kingdom.208 It is difficult to envision
how a U.S. business firm whose activities fall within the definitional bound-
aries of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act—in other words, a business that is
engaged in transnational business activities—would escape the jurisdictional
reach of the United Kingdom’s Bribery Act. Moreover, a meaningful discus-
sion of constraints on the payment of facilitating bribes by business firms
engaged in transnational activities must take into account more rules than
just the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the Bribery Act; of the more than
fifty countries that have enacted rules similar to the Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act, only five include exceptions for facilitating payments.209 A U.S.
firm does not enjoy a competitive advantage over a British firm, because to
the extent that both firms engage in transnational business, then both firms
are subject to the entire international regime. It is nonsensical to suggest that
a U.S. firm is subject only to a small portion of that regime and a British
firm is subject only to another portion. An analysis predicated on such as-
sumptions is meaningless.
Hills also asks the wrong question. Questions about effects on individ-
ual business firms have little to do with the purpose of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act or of the anticorruption regime in general. The Act was
adopted to strengthen the integrity and functionality of the market. The ap-
propriate question, therefore, is not whether a particular firm is advantaged
by the facilitating payment exception but instead what effect the facilitating
payment exception has on the integrity of the global market.
Asking that question leads to critical information that is ignored when
merely attempting to discern advantage. Facilitating payments inflict sub-
stantial damage on the global market.210 Among other things, facilitating
payments distort allocations of public resources, encourage the creation of
bureaucratic obstacles and over-regulation, erode the functionality of critical
government agencies, and contribute to endemic corruption.211 The Organi-
zation of Economic Cooperation and Development, recognizing the “corro-
sive effect of small facilitation payments, particularly on sustainable
economic development and the rule of law,” supports the elimination of fa-
cilitating payment exceptions in domestic implementation of the anticorrup-
tion regime.212
208 Misty Robinson, Global Approach to Anti-Bribery and Corruption, an Overview:
Much Done, But A Lot More to Do, 37 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 303, 319 (2012).
209 Jordan, supra note 62, at 888–89. R
210 Alexandros Zervos, Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Repealing the Ex-
emption for Routine Government Action Payments, 25 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 251, 263–64
(2006) (“[T]he majority of economic and development experts . . . argue that ‘small scale’
bribery is extremely harmful.”).
211 Antonio Argandon˜a, Corruption and Companies: The Use of Facilitating Payments, 60
J. BUS. ETHICS 251, 257–58 (2005).
212 C(2010)19: Recommendations of the Council for Further Combating Bribery of For-
eign Public Officials in International Business Transactions ¶ VI, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERA-
TION AND DEV. (2010), http://acts.oecd.org/Instruments/ShowInstrumentView.aspx?Instrument
ID=258&Lang=en [http://perma.cc/3M86-NG27]. When drafting its Convention Against
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Proposals to amend the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to include an
adequate procedures defense provide a second illustration. Mike Koehler and
others have suggested that the Act be amended so that business firms that
have implemented substantive programs to control bribery are shielded from
liability for the bribes paid by employees or affiliates.213 The existence of an
adequate procedures defense in the United Kingdom’s antibribery law may
have spurred these proposals, although the proposals take many forms.214
The proposal is controversial, in part due to concerns that it would dilute the
enforceability of the Act, as well as concerns that business firms could ac-
quire immunity through implementing weak compliance programs.215 Oppo-
nents of the proposal also point out that proponents of such a change have no
verifiable complaints “other than that the authorities are enforcing the
law.”216
Analysis of these proposals could embrace a neomercantilist perspec-
tive. Deiter Juedes, for example, clearly approaches these proposals from a
neomercantilist position. Juedes begins with a remarkable empirical asser-
tion: “To survive in today’s complex commercial world, many American
corporations must develop international business relationships and pursue
transactional opportunities abroad. For these American firms, the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act is the most important United States law governing
international commerce.”217 Juedes does not explain why the Act surpasses
in importance tax laws, financial rules, licensing permissions, local laws,
and the many other laws that a business firm will encounter in any given
transaction, but his siloing of U.S. firms sets the stage for a neomercantilist
criticism of the Act:
With the increased enforcement of the FCPA and the difficulties in
complying with the statute, American firms are at a disadvantage
when it comes to competing internationally. Indeed, both large and
small firms have spent millions of dollars on FCPA compliance,
Corruption, the OECD deliberated permitting facilitating payments but intentionally left the
language of the Convention open for interpretation. Philip M. Nichols, Who Allows Facilitat-
ing Payments?, 14 AGORA WITHOUT FRONTIERS 303, 310–11 (2009).
213 Mike Koehler, Revisiting a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Compliance Defense, 2012
WIS. L. REV. 609, 617; see Jordan, supra note 207, at 60 (suggesting that the United States R
should consider an adequate procedures defense either through amendment or through
procedure).
214 See Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 191, at 333 (describing several proposals). R
215 See, e.g., Philip Urofsky, Hee Won (Marina) Moon & Jennifer Rimm, How Should We
Measure the Effectiveness of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act? Don’t Break What Isn’t Bro-
ken—The Fallacies of Reform, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1145, 1172 (2012); Press Release, Trans-
parency Int’l, Broad Coalition of 33 Civil Society and Socially Responsible Investment
Leaders Call on Congress to Refrain from Introducing Legislation Amending FCPA (Jan. 12,
2012), http://www.transparency.org/files/content/pressrelease/20120112_Interna-
tional_FCPA_letter_EN.pdf [http://perma.cc/RM2C-XRV7]; Schwartz & Goldberg, supra
note 191, at 334 (describing arguments against the proposal). R
216 Urofsky, Moon & Rimm, supra note 215, at 1147. R
217 Deiter Juedes, Taming the FCPA Overreach Through an Adequate Procedures Defense,
4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 37, 39 (2013).
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have poured money and energy into internal investigations aimed
at determining whether a FCPA violation occurred, and have, in
certain instances, avoided foreign markets altogether because of
the FCPA. These implications reveal just how helpless American
firms are against the FCPA. American firms need some type of
tool that will incentivize compliance with the Act and curtail lia-
bility when the DOJ or SEC brings an action, and this tool is an
“adequate procedures” defense.218
The observation that business firms need to spend money to create programs
in order to comply with a long-standing law is less sensational than Juedes
probably intends it to be. But Juedes errs in three substantial ways. First,
Juedes’s siloing of U.S. business firms implies that they and only they are
subject to the strictures of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. This is not true.
As is the case with most laws criminalizing transnational bribery, the Act
has broad jurisdictional reach.219 In fact, many of the recent high profile
prosecutions of violations of the Act have been of business firms headquar-
tered outside of the United States.220
Second, and conversely, firms engaged in transnational activities are
likely subject to the United Kingdom’s Bribery Act.221 The Bribery Act does
provide a safe harbor for firms that have implemented legitimate compliance
programs, but it also imposes strict liability on firms that have not—such
firms are strictly liable for any bribes paid by employees or affiliates.222 Jon
Jordan points out that in the United States prosecutors exercise discretion
toward firms with legitimate compliance programs and the sentencing guide-
lines mandate leniency for such firms, which he suggests is little different
than the strict liability/safe harbor structure found in the laws of the United
Kingdom; business firms, he suggests, are essentially presented with the
same requirements by each set of laws.223 Jordan’s observation resonates with
the broader observation that domestic laws prohibiting transnational bribery
are components of a global regime, and that analysis of those domestic laws
must take into account the contextual reality of the global regime. As a prac-
tical matter, the observation suggests that all business firms that engage in
transnational activity, no matter where they are headquartered, should con-
sider the establishment of a compliance program that satisfies the official
218 Id. at 42 (citations omitted).
219 See Amy Deen Westbrook, Enthusiastic Enforcement, Informal Legislation: The Un-
ruly Expansion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 45 GA. L. REV. 489, 552–53 (2011).
220 Id.
221 See Bruce W. Bean & Emma H. MacGuidwin, The Extraterritorial Grasp of Anti-
Bribery Legislation: Expansive Reach—Useless Guidance: An Introduction to the U.K. Brib-
ery Act of 2010, 18 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 323, 338–39 (2012) (noting not only the broad
reach of the Bribery Act but also the United Kingdom’s explicit plan to hold all business firms
to its standards).
222 Joseph W. Yockey, Solicitation, Extortion, and the FCPA, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
781, 803–04 (2011).
223 See Jordan, supra note 207, at 49–50. R
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\53-1\HLL108.txt unknown Seq: 39 20-JAN-16 10:26
2016] Neomercantilist Fallacy 241
requirements of the United Kingdom and the unofficial requirements of the
United States.224
Finally, as with Hills, Juedes’s focus is misplaced. The Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act was enacted to strengthen the marketplace, rather than to be-
stow advantage on any particular business firm. Proposals to create a safe
harbor for business firms that have implemented legitimate procedural safe-
guards can be evaluated from the perspective of the objectives of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act.225 A meaningful analysis would not attempt to discern
advantage to a particular firm but would instead examine the extent to which
the proposed safe harbor would enhance the integrity of the global market.
Analyzing the efficacy of a safe harbor would obviate concerns that it would
create only “a fac¸ade of compliance and allow business to proceed with a
wink and nod.”226 Arguably, well-designed compliance programs would
deputize business firms as “partners with” the government “in rooting out
corruption,” which would magnify the Act’s positive effect on the global
market.227 A meaningful analysis of proposals for a safe harbor would also
take into account the fact that the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act is embedded
in a global anticorruption regime. Notably, the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, the United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime, and the World Bank recognize “the integral role the private sector
plays in the fight against corruption and call[ ] for greater public-private
partnership in this effort.”228 These organizations, working with the G20,
offer guidance in how business firms can create compliance programs that
satisfy the requirements of the global regime.229 This salient and useful point
is lost in a neomercantilist analysis.
Andrew Spalding’s proposal for the distribution of fines accrued
through prosecution of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act offers a third illus-
tration. Spalding has suggested that prohibitions on transnational bribery de-
ter business activity in endemically corrupt polities, most of which are
developing or emerging countries.230 Rather than a system that relies entirely
on punishing bribe-payers, Spalding calls for attention to principles of re-
224 See, e.g., Homer E. Moyer, Jr., Complying with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in a
Down Economy, CORPORATE COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS (Jun. 23, 2009), http://www.corporatecom
plianceinsights.com/complying-with-the-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-in-a-down-economy/
[http://perma.cc/KHW2-JYNX].
225 See Michael Peterson, Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Should the Brib-
ery Act 2010 Be a Guideline?, 12 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 417, 427 (2013) (arguing that
the safe harbor would help to fulfill the objectives of the Act).
226 Urofsky, Moon & Rimm, supra note 215, at 1172. R
227 Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 191, at 319. R
228 ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME &
WORLD BANK, ANTI-CORRUPTION ETHICS AND COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK FOR BUSINESS 3
(2013), http://www.oecd.org/corruption/Anti-CorruptionEthicsComplianceHandbook.pdf
[http://perma.cc/BNY2-EP55].
229 See id. at 15.
230 Andrew B. Spalding, Four Uncharted Corners of Anti-Corruption Law: In Search of
Remedies to the Sanctioning Effect, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 661, 663.
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storative justice.231 In particular, he suggests that a substantial percentage of
any fine or settlement pursuant to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act be used
to fund anticorruption programs in the country or countries in which the
underlying bribery occurred.232
From a neomercantilist perspective, Spalding’s proposal might seem
quaint or irrelevant.233 The proposal does not, after all, relate directly to en-
hancing the ability of U.S. business firms to conduct business profitably. The
proposal does not advantage U.S. business firms over those of other coun-
tries. A neomercantilist analysis of Spalding’s proposal would probably in-
volve an estimation of the revenue lost by the federal government and a
(generally erroneous) estimation of the change in revenue to U.S. business
firms.234
Viewed with the objectives of the Act in mind, however, the proposal
becomes very interesting. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was enacted in
order to strengthen the integrity of the global market. Anticorruption pro-
grams could significantly contribute to achieving that objective. Many de-
veloping and emerging economies have an appetite for these types of
programs, and although evaluating the effectiveness of programs is difficult,
the consensus among practitioners is that anticorruption programs do con-
tribute to reducing bribery and strengthening markets.235
Reducing bribery in developing and emerging economies would signifi-
cantly contribute to the integrity of the global market. Bribery is considered
by many to be the single greatest barrier to the formation of transnational
relationships, particularly in developing and emerging countries.236 Nearly
forty-five percent of senior executives reported in a survey by PWC that
they had foregone entry into particular markets or had not entered into par-
231 Id. at 677–78.
232 Andrew B. Spalding, Does Anti-Bribery Enforcement Reduce Bribery?, 49 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. (forthcoming 2015).
233 Cf. Beverley Earle, The United States’ Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the OECD
Anti-Bribery Recommendation: When Moral Suasion Won’t Work, Try the Money Argument, 14
DICK. J. INT’L L. 207, 209 (1996) (“Fighters of corruption, such as former President Jimmy
Carter, were often ridiculed as ‘do gooders’ who ignored the realities of business.”).
234 Cf. Eric M. Pedersen, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and its Application to U.S.
Business Operations in China, 7 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 13, 43 (2008) (evaluating the costs and
benefits of proposed changes to the issuance of opinion letters in Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
actions).
235 See Steven E. Hendrix, New Approaches to Addressing Corruption in the Context of
U.S. Foreign Aid with Examples from Latin America and the Caribbean, 12 SW. J.L. & TRADE
AM. 1, 14 (2005) (discussing examples of successful programs); Patricio Maldonado & Ge-
rardo D. Berthin, Transparency and Developing Legal Frameworks to Combat Corruption in
Latin America, 10 SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 201, 259 (2004) (discussing demand for high-quality
anticorruption programs).
236 See James H. Davis & John A. Ruhe, Perceptions of Country Corruption: Antecedents
and Outcomes, 43 J. BUS. ETHICS 275, 276 (2003) (reporting that the World Bank considers
corruption the greatest impediment to global commercial relationships); Adam Raviv, Jigsaw
Sovereignty: The Economic Consequences of Decentralization in Post-Dayton Bosnia, 37 GEO.
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 109, 113–16 (2005) (noting that “corruption that is endemic to [parallel
institutions] can serve as a barrier to foreign investment”).
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ticular relationships due to concerns regarding bribery, while a survey by
Deloitte found that nearly half of the respondents had foregone relationships
over bribery concerns.237 Even though the European Union, which is still the
world’s largest single market, hosts several nations with low levels of cor-
ruption, more than forty percent of businesspeople surveyed there consider
bribery a serious obstacle to business relationships; among emerging econ-
omy members of the Union that response rises to over sixty percent.238
Global, ongoing surveys of transnational businesspeople, such as the Busi-
ness Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey or the World Eco-
nomic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index, consistently find that
businesspeople consider corruption one of the most serious barriers to form-
ing business relationships in emerging economies.239 Numerous surveys
within emerging economies find that bribery constitutes the most serious
barrier to business relationships.240 Bribery in emerging economies weakens
237 DELOITTE DEVELOPMENT LLC, LOOK BEFORE YOU LEAP: MANAGING RISK IN GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENTS 7 (2011), http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/fi-
nance/us-fas-lby-look-before-you-leap-navigating-risks-in-emerging-markets-102412.pdf
[http://perma.cc/2AC9-LY8T]; PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, CONFRONTING CORRUPTION: THE
BUSINESS CASE FOR AN EFFECTIVE ANTI-CORRUPTION PROGRAMME 2 (2008), http://www.pwc
.com/gx/en/psrc/pdf/confronting_corruption_effective_anti-corruption_programme.pdf [http://
perma.cc/VR2L-EAEB].
238 EUR. COMM’N, FLASH EUROBAROMETER 374: BUSINESS’ ATTITUDES TOWARD CORRUP-
TION IN THE EU 17 (2014), http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_374_en.pdf [http://per
ma.cc/7CHN-782K]; see generally EUR. COMM’N, EU ANTI-CORRUPTION REPORT 3 (2014),
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:058aecf0-d9b7-11e3-8cd4-
01aa75ed71a1.0012.01/DOC_1&format=PDF [http://perma.cc/2B26-KPBF] (“Corruption
alone is estimated to cost the EU economy EUR 120 billion per year, just a little less than the
annual budget of the European Union.”).
239 E.g., Press Release, World Bank, Kyrgyz Republic: Business Climate Improved, But
Corruption Remains Key Problem—New World Bank-EBRD Study (Apr. 2, 2014), http://
www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2014/04/02/kyrgyz-republic-business-climate-im-
proved-but-corruption-remains-key-problem-new-world-bank-ebrd-study [http://perma.cc/
B4NP-W3C6] (noting that, even as other business barriers recede, corruption is considered by
businesspeople the second-greatest barrier to engaging in business relationships in Kyrgyz-
stan); Press Release, United Nations Office on Drugs & Crime, EU, UNODC and EFCC Part-
ner with the National Bureau of Statistics in the Conduct of the First Ever Crime and
Corruption Survey in Nigeria (July 1, 2010), http://www.unodc.org/nigeria/en/press-re-
lease_business-crime-and-corruption-survey-in-nigeria.html [http://perma.cc/6CXX-QDJW]
(“The survey reveals that for more than 70% of Nigerian businesses, crime and corruption
constitute the most serious obstacles to conducting business in Nigeria.”); Press Release, Busi-
ness Enterprise and Enterprise Performance Survey, The Russian Regions: Results 1 (May
2013), http://www.ebrd.com/documents/comms-and-bis/business-environment-and-enterprise-
performance-survey-the-russian-regions.pdf [http://perma.cc/E6XK-D5T7] (“The 2012
BEEPS results show that most enterprises in Russia identify corruption, access to finance and
workforce skills as the main constraints.”).
240 E.g., GRANT THORNTON VIETNAM, PRIVATE EQUITY IN VIETNAM: INVESTMENT SENTI-
MENT AND OUTLOOK QUARTER 2, 2013 5 (2013) (reporting that private equity investors con-
tinue to identify corruption as one of the three greatest obstacles to investment); Elena
Denisova-Schmidt, Corruption and Informal Practices in Russia, 7 EUXEINOS 4, 8–9 (2012),
https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/publications/216729 [https://perma.cc/9KGF-TJUE]
(describing numerous surveys of businesspeople in Russia); Erin Sheley, Perceptual Harm and
the Corporate Criminal, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 225, 251 (2012) (reporting a 2005 World Bank
survey that found “that 71% of businesses considered corruption the biggest barrier to foreign
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already fragile governance mechanisms for foreign investors and exacer-
bates difficulties with already cumbersome procedures for the entry of goods
and services.241 Emerging economies, however, constitute the fastest grow-
ing potential markets and are predicted to drive global economic growth
following the recession.242 Assigning penalties and settlements accrued from
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act prosecutions would resonate with the very
heart of the reasons for the enactment and amendment of the Act.
VII. CONCLUSION
Analyzing law through the lens of enhancing the integrity of a market
does not present a new paradigm for legal scholarship. The antitrust laws of
the United States were enacted for many purposes, of which the Supreme
Court has most recently emphasized “the purpose of the antitrust laws . . . is
‘the protection of competition, not competitors.’” 243 The Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act is not perfectly analogous to antitrust law, but it too was en-
acted for many reasons, one of the most important of which was enhancing
the integrity of the global market.244 Protecting the integrity of a market is a
legitimate and worthwhile goal: in addition to fundamental concepts such as
fairness and diversity, antitrust law anticipates a well-functioning market
that allows for “the development of new and improved products, and the
introduction of new production, distribution, and organizational techniques
for putting economic resources to beneficial use.”245 The same benefits can
be accrued through proper administration of the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act. Justice Breyer warns, however, that at times “policymakers will protect
competitors instead of protecting competition” and that this will probably
investment” in Russia); see Jelena Budak & Edo Rajh, Corruption as an Obstacle for Doing
Business in the Western Balkans: A Business Sector Perspective 14-15 (Ekonomski Institut
Zagreb, Working Paper No.1104, 2011), http://hrcak.srce.hr/index.php?show=clanak&id_cla
nak_jezik=112046  [http://perma.cc/C6KL-ZFHD] (reporting survey of business people in
Balkans showing bribery is serious obstacle to entering into business relationships).
241 Norman D. Bishara, Governance and Corruption Constraints in the Middle East:
Overcoming the Business Ethics Glass Ceilings, 48 AM. BUS. L.J. 227, 237–38 (2011); see
Spahn, supra note 57, at 867. R
242 See M. Ayhan Kose & Eswar S. Prasad, Emerging Markets Come of Age, FIN. & DEV.
7, 10 (2010); Enrique R. Carrasco, An Opening for Voice in the Global Economic Order: The
Global Financial Crisis and Emerging Economies, 12 OR. REV. INT’L L. 179, 195 (2010)
(stating that half of global economic growth was driven by emerging economies); Yvonne C.L.
Lee, A Reversal of Neo-Colonialism: The Pitfalls and Prospects of Sovereign Wealth Funds,
40 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1103, 1142–43 (2009) (comparing high growth rates in emerging econo-
mies to comparatively stagnant growth in mature economies).
243 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 906 (2007) (quoting
Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 338 (1990)); see Zephyr Teachout,
Neoliberal Political Law, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 215, 233–34 (2014) (describing the
many goals of antitrust laws and the genesis of the notion that antitrust rules are intended to
protect the marketplace and consumer welfare).
244 See supra notes 21–52 and accompanying text. R
245 Donald F. Turner, The Durability, Relevance, and Future of American Antitrust Policy,
75 CALIF. L. REV. 797, 798 (1987).
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happen “when regulators or antitrust enforcers confuse means with ends by
thinking that the object of the law is to protect individual firms from busi-
ness risks rather than to bring consumers the price and production benefits
that typically arise from the competitive process.”246 This danger is particu-
larly manifest in the neomercantilist analysis of the Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act.
The reason for the persistence of the neomercantilist motif in analysis
of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act may not be the difficulty in analysis qua
analysis but instead with the contextual reality of business. The Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act, though a domestic law, applies only to those business
firms that engage in some form of transnational business. For all business
firms, but particularly for those engaged in transnational activities, the world
in which they operate seems to be a different world than that envisioned by
traditional legal analysis. Steve Kobrin, who writes at length about the con-
textual transformation of business operation, uses the term “globaliza-
tion.”247 Legal regulation has not caught up with business.248 Nor, perhaps,
has the legal analysis of the regulation of globalized business. Peer Zumban-
sen depicts two reactions by legal analysts to the progression of
globalization:
One view insists on emphasizing and lamenting the alleged weak-
ness of (the state’s) regulatory law that finds its most persuasive
illustration in the triumphant proliferation of private norm-setting
and suggests that law cannot escape death by suffocation in the
oxygen-free atmosphere of globalization. The competing view
presents a radicalized version of the first: it holds up an idealized
image of the nation-state and its legal order as unified, hierarchi-
cal, and coherent—only to suffer from the undermining and corro-
sive effects of globalization. From this perspective, globalization is
depicted as a process that emerges in (a particular) time and from
outside the nation-state to destroy the state-based legal order. Such
depictions of law “as it lay dying” suggest, above all, that law
would enjoy blissful health and strength if only it had been pro-
tected from globalization. What happened?249
Neither of these need come to pass. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act inter-
acts robustly with the reality of business operations in a globalized context.
In order to continue doing so, however, legal scholars and policymakers
must understand the Act as part of that contextual reality, and must avoid the
neomercantilist fallacy.
246 Stephen G. Breyer, Antitrust, Deregulation, and the Newly Liberated Marketplace, 75
CALIF. L. REV. 1005, 1018 (1987).
247 Kobrin, supra note 176, at 181. R
248 See Burkeen, supra note 135, at 219 (“The process of economic globalization has R
progressed more rapidly than the restructuring of the public institutions that regulate it.”).
249 Zumbansen, supra note 134, at 122 (citations omitted). R
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Fealty to the purpose and intent of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act is
not just a matter of intellectual rigor. The very concept of neomercantilism
implies that the global market is a zero sum game. This, too, is an error. If
structured with integrity the global market, as any market, grows and inno-
vates and expands. U.S. business firms, along with everyone else, will be
made better off not by gaming the market in an attempt to confer advantage,
but by preserving and enhancing the integrity of the market.
